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role for effective government in making needed public 
investments. Our strategy—strikingly different from the 
theories driving economic policy in recent years—calls for fiscal 
discipline and for increased public investment in key growth-
enhancing areas. The Project will put forward innovative 
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controversial, policy options into the national debate with  
the goal of improving our country’s economic policy.
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 Abstract
Within a market-based economy, success is maximized if policies directly address specific market prob-
lems. For technology innovation relevant to mitigating greenhouse gases (GHGs), the two principal 
market problems are a lack of private incentive to reduce GHGs by adopting low-GHG technologies, 
and underinvestment by industry in research and development (R&D), especially basic research. The 
strategy thus has two main parts to directly confront these two market problems, thereby increas-
ing both the demand for and the supply of GHG-reducing innovations: (1) inducing innovation in 
industry through a stable, long-term price on GHGs, reinforced by permanent R&D tax credits, and 
(2) complementing this innovation through increased public support for targeted climate mitigation 
research in universities, other research institutions, and in the private sector.
The innovation strategy specifically recommends gradually increasing federal spending for climate 
mitigation research to roughly $8 billion per year over the next eight years, or roughly doubling 
energy research from 2007 levels by 2016. This increased funding should prioritize strategic basic 
research inspired by critical needs arising from efforts to develop new and improved GHG mitigation 
technologies, and should invest in training the next generation of scientists and engineers. Increased 
resources need to be tied to an effective management and coordination strategy for research focused 
on climate mitigation technology to ensure these funds are employed efficiently. Finally, a portion 
of these funds should be targeted to inducement prizes that provide financial rewards for achieving sig-
nificant advances in climate mitigation innovation. In doing so, these funds would engage a broad set 
of innovators.
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1.1. overview of the Problem
To meet the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions targets in U.S. legislative proposals will re-quire large-scale adoption and innovation of 
GHG-reducing technologies throughout the U.S. 
economy, including technologies for increased ener-
gy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear power, and 
carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage. Meeting 
commonly discussed goals for stabilizing GHGs in 
the atmosphere will require similar technological 
changes across the global energy system, moving 
it dramatically away from a reliance on fossil fuels 
that is currently at more than 80 percent. While 
the importance of new technology in solving the 
climate problem is widely understood, there is con-
siderable debate about what specific public policies 
and programs are necessary to bring about these 
technological changes as effectively and efficiently 
as possible. The potential economic payoff from 
well-designed policies is high, with potential U.S. 
mitigation costs through 2050 being on the order 
of $1 to $10 trillion (< 1 to 3 percent) of discounted 
gross domestic product (GDP), or an annualized 
$50 billion–$500 billion per year. Advanced tech-
nology holds the potential to significantly lower 
costs and expand options for GHG mitigation.
1.2. overview of the Innovation 
Strategy
The innovation strategy is based on the simple 
principle that, within a market-based economy, 
success is maximized if policies directly address 
specific market problems. By directly addressing 
those problems, the policies should be designed to 
harness the power of private sector incentives for 
societal gain, and the direct governmental research 
role should be designed to complement rather than 
substitute for activities commonly undertaken by 
industry.
In the context of GHG-relevant technology in-
novation, there are two principal market problems 
(Goulder 2004; Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2005; 
Newell 2007a). First and foremost, there is the en-
vironmental externality of global climate change. If 
firms and households do not have to pay for the 
climate damage imposed by GHG emissions, then 
these emissions will be too high. This has implica-
tions for technology innovation and adoption be-
cause, if there is no demand for GHG reductions, 
then the demand for GHG-reducing technologies 
will also be too low. In turn, there will be insuffi-
cient incentive for companies to invest in mitigation 
technology R&D, because there will be little mar-
ket demand for any innovations that might come 
of it.1 A market-based emissions policy that places 
a price on GHGs—through either a cap-and-trade 
system or an emissions tax—is widely accepted to 
be a cost-effective response to this problem.
Second, there are problems specific to the market 
for innovations—not just with respect to climate, 
but more broadly. Knowledge, just like a stable cli-
mate, is a public good; it is well known individual 
companies cannot capture the full value of invest-
ing in innovation. That value tends to spill over to 
other technology producers and users, thereby di-
minishing individual private incentives for R&D; 
this problem tends to worsen the more basic and 
long term is the research. Therefore, well-targeted 
policy that boosts the level of innovation for climate 
mitigation technology has the potential to lower the 
overall cost of attaining long-term climate goals. 
The strategy thus has two main parts to directly 
confront these two market problems: (1) inducing 
innovation in industry through a price on GHGs, 
1. Introduction
1. For simplicity, the term R&D is intended to include initial “first-of-a-kind” demonstration projects focused on generating new knowl-
edge.
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 reinforced by permanent R&D tax credits, and (2) 
complementing this innovation through increased 
public support for targeted research at universities, 
other research institutions, and in the private sec-
tor.
The first part of the innovation strategy seeks to 
harness the power of private sector investment. In-
dustry performs 71 percent and funds 66 percent 
of total U.S. R&D, and is central to the U.S. in-
novation system. The single most important part of 
solving the climate technology problem is therefore 
to address the GHG externality through emissions 
pricing, giving the private sector a clear market sig-
nal of the returns to clean energy and other rel-
evant innovations. This does not mean, however, 
that emissions pricing is the only important tool 
necessary to achieve climate mitigation goals. Sci-
ence and technology policy to expand our options 
and reduce the future costs of mitigation has a valu-
able and important role to play, as long as it focuses 
on creating new knowledge. Encouraging increased 
private sector R&D by making the R&D tax credit 
permanent would bolster private incentives for in-
novation that would be induced by the emissions 
price, and would improve innovation incentives 
more generally.
While critical, more than three-fourths of industrial 
R&D is focused on development as opposed to basic 
and applied research. In contrast, universities, other 
nonprofits, and federal labs perform 85 percent of 
basic research, more than half (59 percent) of which 
is funded by the federal government (National Sci-
ence Board 2008). These institutions play a comple-
mentary role to industry in the innovation system, 
so there is a need for policy that will supplement 
industrial R&D with more basic research relevant 
to lowering the cost of GHG mitigation and meet-
ing other energy policy goals.
The second part of the climate innovation strategy 
is to gradually increase federal spending for climate 
mitigation R&D to roughly $8 billion per year 
(about $6.1 billion in real terms) over the next eight 
years, or roughly to double energy R&D from 2007 
levels by 2016. This funding should place a prior-
ity on strategic basic research inspired by critical 
needs arising from efforts to develop new and im-
proved GHG mitigation technologies. At the same 
time, this funding should invest in training the next 
generation of scientists and engineers. In order to 
encourage exploration of novel, emergent, or inte-
grative concepts for addressing climate change, a 
program should also be established for exploratory 
research that pursues transformational technologies 
that may not fit well within existing basic or applied 
research programs. Increased resources need to be 
tied to an effective strategy for managing and coor-
dinating climate mitigation technology research to 
ensure these funds are employed efficiently. Finally, 
a portion of these funds should be used to supple-
ment the traditional research contracts and grants 
structure with inducement prizes that provide fi-
nancial rewards for achieving significant advances 
in climate mitigation innovation. Prizes of this type 
can help focus research efforts on clearly defined 
objectives, instill a sense of urgency and competi-
tion, and engage a broad set of innovators.
Together, this strategy seeks to increase both the 
demand for and the supply of GHG-reducing in-
novations in a balanced way that emphasizes those 
aspects of the overall innovation process that the 
private and public components of the system are 
best oriented toward advancing. R&D push with-
out the pull of demand is like pushing on a rope—
ultimately doomed to failure. Market demand-pull 
without supportive R&D policies misses longer-
term opportunities for significantly lowering GHG 
reduction costs and expanding opportunities for 
greater GHG mitigation. A coupled “emissions 
price plus R&D” strategy offers the best opportu-
nity for mitigating GHG emissions at the lowest 
possible cost to society. Likewise, ratcheting up 
R&D and other technology policies in an attempt 
to compensate for insufficiently stringent emissions 
policy can dramatically raise the cost of achieving 
a given amount of GHG mitigation (Fischer and 
Newell 2008a, 2008b).
Note there are some aspects of climate technol-
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ogy policy that lie beyond the focus of this strategy. 
This includes the design of technology deployment 
policy, international climate technology policy, and 
programs related to the development of technolo-
gies for adaptation and direct climate modification. 
Although addressed to some degree here, for a more 
complete review of the role and design of technol-
ogy deployment policies, see Newell (2007b); for 
a discussion of international climate technology 
strategies, see de Coninck et al. (2008) and Newell 
(2008).2
1.3. roadmap
The next section (§2) lays out the technology chal-
lenge for climate change mitigation, describing cur-
rent conditions and trends in GHG emissions and 
energy technologies, likely effects of projected GHG 
emissions on the global climate, the economic scale 
2. Newell (2008) considers opportunities for improved and expanded international development and transfer of climate technologies. That 
paper clarifies the importance of options for inducing technology market demand through domestic GHG pricing, international trade, and 
international development assistance. It then turns to upstream innovation strategies, including international coordination and funding of 
climate technology R&D, and knowledge transfer through intellectual property. Newell (2008) concludes that a successful international 
effort to accelerate and then sustain the rate of development and transfer of GHG mitigation technologies must harness a diverse set of 
markets and institutions beyond those explicitly related to climate, to include those for energy, trade, development, and intellectual prop-
erty.
of the mitigation challenge, and the importance of 
advanced technology for lowering associated costs 
and expanding options. Section 3 highlights the 
key market problems relevant to GHG technology 
innovation, reviews current patterns and trends in 
private and public R&D, and identifies the highest 
priority areas for public policy in relation to private 
sector action.
In §4, I describe the part of the innovation strat-
egy focused on inducing private sector innovation 
through a market-based price on GHG emissions, 
reinforced by permanent R&D tax credits. In §5, I 
turn to the part of the innovation strategy focused 
on complementing private innovation through ex-
pansion of federal funding for climate mitigation 
research, including an effective management strat-
egy and the use of innovation inducement prizes. 
The final section (§6) concludes the paper.
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Since it was adopted in 1992, the United Na-tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been ratified by vir-
tually all the world’s 190-plus countries, including 
the United States. The treaty’s principal objective, 
as stated in Article 2, is “stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system” (United Nations 
1992, 4). Although there is much debate about what 
level of GHG concentrations “would prevent dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference,” one thing is 
clear—stabilizing GHG concentrations at any level 
eventually implies reducing net GHG emissions to 
near zero.3
2.1. the energy technology mix and 
ghg emissions: Current Conditions and 
trends
While the idea of balancing the atmospheric GHG 
stock by reducing the net GHG flow to zero is simple 
enough, the technological reality of what it will take 
to do this is far from simple. The current reality is 
that 84 percent of U.S. GHG emissions come from 
fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and natural gas, which 
satisfy 85 percent of U.S. energy consumption (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration [EIA] 2008a).4 
The remainder of U.S. energy consumption is sup-
plied by nuclear power (8 percent) and renewable 
energy (7 percent), such as biomass, hydroelectric 
power, geothermal, wind, and solar power. Global 
statistics are similar: about 81 percent of world en-
ergy supply comes from fossil fuels, 6 percent from 
nuclear, and 13 percent from renewable sources (In-
ternational Energy Agency [IEA] 2007b).
Stabilizing GHG concentrations therefore requires 
large-scale and widespread substitution toward 
energy technologies with low to zero net GHG 
emissions throughout the U.S. and global energy 
systems. Unfortunately, this is not the direction in 
which we have been heading. Given existing poli-
cies and expected market trends, the EIA “reference 
case” forecast has U.S. energy consumption increas-
ing 19 percent and CO2 emissions by 16 percent by 
2030 over current levels, with a continued domi-
nance of fossil fuels in the energy mix (80 percent 
fossil fuels, 8 percent nuclear power, and 12 percent 
from renewables in 2030; EIA 2008b).5 While U.S. 
biofuel use is forecast to increase—due in large part 
to the renewable fuels provisions of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007—so is the 
share of coal, from 23 percent up to 25 percent of 
total U.S. energy consumption.
Global forecasts are equally—if not more—at odds 
with a vision of a future energy technology system 
having declining GHG emissions. The IEA refer-
ence case forecast is that world energy consump-
tion will grow 55 percent and energy-related CO2 
emissions a whopping 57 percent between 2005 
and 2030, with the fossil fuel share actually rising 
slightly from 81 to 82 percent (IEA 2007b). Over 
a longer timeframe, modelers of the integrated en-
ergy-economic-climate system typically estimate 
that—without additional policy actions—annual 
CO2 emissions will increase by a factor of about two 
2. the technology Challenge for Climate Change mitigation
3. Some nonzero level of continued GHG emissions is consistent with stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations since those emissions 
are eventually removed from the atmosphere and deposited in the deep ocean through the carbon cycle.
4. U.S. fossil fuel–related GHG emissions are 81 percent from carbon dioxide (CO2), and 3 percent collectively from methane (CH4) and 
nitrous oxide (N2O) (EPA 2008b).
5. The term reference case is used to refer to a scenario that typically assumes no GHG mitigation (or other energy) policy is applied beyond 
what has already been adopted. This is also often called a baseline scenario. The term business as usual is often used interchangeably, but I 
avoid this term because the market and technological changes embodied in these reference case projections imply significant changes rela-
tive to current conditions.
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in the United States and three globally by the end 
of this century (Clarke et al. 2007; Fisher et al. 2007; 
Weyant, de la Chesnaye, and Blanford 2006).6
These and other forecasts serve to underscore what 
is by now perhaps painfully obvious—the energy-
economic system has a tremendous predilection 
toward fossil fuel–based technologies and is not go-
ing to right itself with respect to the global climate 
absent substantial public policies that encourage it 
to do so. The simple reason is that, given the exist-
ing suite of technological options, fossil fuels have 
tended to be a more reliable source of large quanti-
ties of relatively inexpensive energy compared to 
more climate-friendly alternatives. This continues 
to be the case even with recent increases in oil, nat-
ural gas, and coal prices. In economic terms, GHG 
emissions by anyone impose an environmental ex-
ternality cost on everyone, yet this cost goes unpaid 
and emissions remain too high unless policy is in 
place to put a price on GHGs.
2.2. Climate Change Science and 
the likely effects of Increased ghg 
Concentrations
At the same time that the scale of these projections 
of energy use and GHG emissions has been sink-
ing in, there has been increased clarity of the sci-
ence underpinning human-caused global warming 
and the potential impacts thereof. As a result, the 
momentum for international commitments and 
national-level policies requiring mandatory GHG 
emissions reductions has intensified significantly. 
In that context, much discussion has surrounded 
targets for stabilizing CO2 concentrations in the 
atmosphere at 550 parts per million of CO2 (ppm 
CO2) or lower, where 550 ppm CO2 represents 
roughly a doubling of CO2 concentrations relative 
to preindustrial levels of 280 ppm CO2; the current 
level is 380 ppm CO2 (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [IPCC] 2007). Other major GHGs 
contribute approximately 70 ppm CO2 equivalent 
(CO2e)
7 to present GHG concentrations, bringing 
the current concentration of the six main GHGs 
in the atmosphere to about 450 ppm CO2e (IPCC 
2007).8
Figure 1 shows the range of long-term warming ex-
pected at different GHG stabilization levels based 
on recent IPCC estimates of the climate sensitiv-
ity—that is, the likely temperature response to a 
change in atmospheric GHG concentrations. The 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 2007, 38) 
states that
  The equilibrium climate sensitivity is a measure of 
the climate system response to sustained radiative 
forcing. It is defined as the equilibrium global aver-
age surface warming following a doubling of CO2 
concentration. …[C]limate sensitivity is likely to be 
in the range of 2°C to 4.5°C with a best estimate of 
about 3°C, and is very unlikely to be less than 1.5°C.
Note that changes in degrees Fahrenheit are 
roughly twice as large as changes in degrees Celsius 
(nine-fifths, to be exact). For each of the different 
GHG stabilization ranges given in CO2e in Fig-
ure 1 (i.e., shaded categories I–VI), Figure 2 shows 
the associated CO2 concentrations, the year that 
global GHG emissions must roughly peak in order 
to achieve these stabilization levels, the change in 
global emissions relative to year 2000, best estimate 
global average temperature increases, global aver-
age sea-level increases, and the number of model 
scenarios on which the estimates are based.
6. There is nonetheless a wide range of forecast emissions levels due to uncertainty in the main driving forces, such as population growth; 
economic development; and energy production, conversion, and end use (Fisher et al. 2007; Weyant 1993, 2000).
7. CO2 equivalence is a means of measuring the total concentration of all GHGs, not solely CO2. The six major GHGs identified in Annex 
A of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC are CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).
8. About 2–3 ppm CO2e are currently added to the atmosphere each year, and this amount has been growing. Other anthropogenic activities 
(including aerosol emissions and land-use changes) have a net cooling effect (negative radiative forcing) such that the current net forcing 
effect from anthropogenic sources is approximately equal to 380 ppm CO2e. Reducing these other activities would make the stabilization 
challenge more difficult.
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fIgUre 2
Projected emissions, temperature Increase, and Sea-level rise for a range of ghg Stabilization  
levels
fIgUre 1
Co2 emissions and equilibrium temperature Increases for a range of ghg Stabilization levels
source: IPCC 200, Figure 5.1, p. 66.
source: IPCC 200, Table 5.1, p. 6.
Global CO2 emissions for 1940 to 2000 and emissions ranges for categories of stabilisation scenarios from 2000 to 2100 (left-hand panel); and the corresponding 
relationship between the stabilisation target and the likely equilibrium global average temperature increase above pre-industrial (righthand panel). Approaching 
equilibrium can take several centuries, especially for scenarios with higher levels of stabilisation. Coloured shadings show stabilisation scenarios grouped according to 
different targets (stabilisation category I to VI). The right-hand panel shows ranges of global average temperature change above pre-industrial, using (i) ‘best estimate’ 
climate sensitivity of °C (line in middle of shaded area), (ii) upper bound of likely range of climate sensitivity of 4.5°C (line at top of shaded area) (iii) lower bound 
of likely range of climate sensitivity of 2°C (line at bottom of shaded area). Black dashed lines in the left panel give the emissions range of recent baseline scenarios 
published since the sREs (2000). Emissions ranges of the stabilisation scenarios comprise CO2-only and multigas scenarios and correspond to the 10th to 90th percentile 
of the full scenario distribution. Note: CO2 emissions in most models do not include emissions from decay of above ground biomass that remains after logging and 
deforestation, and from peat fires and drained peat soils. {wGIII Figures sPM. and sPM.8}
Notes: 
a)  The emission reductions to meet a particular stabilisation level reported in the mitigation studies assessed here might be underestimated due to missing carbon cycle 
feedbacks (see also Topic 2. in IPCC 200). 
b) Atmospheric CO2 concentrations were 9ppm in 2005. The best estimate of total CO2-eq concentration in 2005 for all long-lived GHGs is about 455ppm, while the 
corresponding value including the net effect of all anthropogenic forcing agents is 5ppm CO2-eq. 
c) Ranges correspond to the 15th to 85th percentile of the post-TAR scenario distribution. CO2 emissions are shown so multi-gas scenarios can be compared with CO2-only 
scenarios (see Figure 2.1 in IPCC 200). 
d) The best estimate of climate sensitivity is °C. 
e) Note that global average temperature at equilibrium is different from expected global average temperature at the time of stabilisation of GHG concentrations due to the 
inertia of the climate system. For the majority of scenarios assessed, stabilisation of GHG concentrations occurs between 2100 and 2150 (see also Footnote 0 in IPCC 200). 
f) Equilibrium sea level rise is for the contribution from ocean thermal expansion only and does not reach equilibrium for at least many centuries. These values have 
been estimated using relatively simple climate models (one low-resolution AOGCM and several EMICs based on the best estimate of °C climate sensitivity) and do 
not include contributions from melting ice sheets, glaciers and ice caps. Long-term thermal expansion is projected to result in 0.2 to 0.6m per degree Celsius of global 
average warming above pre-industrial. (AOGCM refers to Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model and EMICs to Earth system Models of Intermediate Complexity.)
28
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
90
0
10
00
0
2
4
6
8
10
19
40
19
60
19
80
20
00
20
20
20
40
20
60
20
80
21
00
−20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
W
o
rl
d
 C
O
2
 e
m
is
si
o
n
s 
(G
tC
O
2
/y
r)
Historical emissions Stabilisation level
E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
 g
lo
b
a
l 
a
ve
ra
g
e
 t
e
m
p
e
ra
tu
re
in
cr
e
a
se
 a
b
o
ve
 p
re
-i
n
d
u
st
ri
a
l 
(o
C
)
VI
V
III
II
I
IV
GHG concentration stabilisation 
level (ppm CO2-eq)
Year
Category CO2 
concentration 
at stabilisation 
(2005 = 379 ppm)b
CO2-equivalent 
concentration 
at stabilisation 
including GHGs 
and aerosols 
(2005 = 375 ppm)b
Peaking 
year for CO2 
emissions a,c
Change in 
global CO2 
emissions in 
2050  
(percent of 2000 
emissions)a,c
Global average 
temperature 
increase above 
pre-industrial at 
equilibrium, using 
‘best estimate’ 
climate sensitivityd,e
Global average 
sea level above 
pre-industrial 
at equilibrium 
from thermal 
expansion only
Number of 
assessed 
scenarios
ppm ppm year percent oC metres
I 350-400 445-490 2000-2015 -85 to -50 2.0-2.4 0.4-1.4 6
II 400-440 490-535 2000-2020 -60 to -30 2.4-2.8 0.5-1.7 18
III 440-485 535-590 2010-2030 -30 to +5 2.8-3.2 0.6-1.9 21
IV 485-570 590-710 2020-2060 +10 to +60 3.2-4.0 0.6-2.4 118
V 570-660 710-855 2050-2080 +25 to +85 4.0-4.9 0.8-2.9 9
VI 660-790 855-1130 2060-2090 +90 to +140 4.9-6.1 1.0-3.7 5
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To get a sense of what current trends imply, typical 
scenarios show reference case atmospheric concen-
trations in the range of 700–900 ppm CO2 (900–
1400 ppm CO2e) by 2100, with continued increases 
beyond this timeframe (Clarke et al. 2007; Weyant, 
de la Chesnaye, and Blanford 2006). This is the far-
right-hand side of Figure 1, or higher, with likely 
eventual global average temperature increases of 
about 4ºC–8.5°C (7ºF–15°F) at 1000 ppm CO2e, 
relative to preindustrial levels. Projected tempera-
ture increases and associated impacts at the region-
al level vary over an even wider range. In contrast, 
stabilization at 550 ppm CO2 (about 670 CO2e) or 
less would significantly reduce the risk of the large 
temperature changes that are associated with cur-
rent trends (Figures 1 and 2).
2.3. economic Scale of the mitigation 
Challenge: emissions targets and 
Projected Costs
In order to gauge, in economic terms, the mag-
nitude of the innovation challenge presented by 
climate change, it is helpful to consider possible 
GHG emissions targets and the projected costs of 
achieving these targets. These projected costs, most 
commonly measured in terms of reduced GDP, in-
dicate the scale of the payoff that could come from 
innovations that significantly reduce (or, in the ex-
treme, eliminate) the cost disadvantage of climate-
friendly technologies relative to the competition. 
If such low-cost alternatives also made it feasible 
and desirable to undertake more significant reduc-
tions than otherwise, then there would be an added 
benefit from the further climate damages that are 
avoided. While this paper focuses on GHG miti-
gation, there are additional benefits from lower-
cost, climate-friendly innovations: in the form of 
increased energy security (e.g., decreased exposure 
to oil price shocks and national security risks); de-
creases in the control costs and increased abatement 
of conventional air pollutants (e.g., particulates, 
mercury, ground-level ozone); increases in prod-
uct quality (e.g., better lighting); and expansion 
of technological possibilities in fields that draw on 
the same underlying advances.9 Indeed, technolo-
gies that would underpin a transition to a climate-
friendly energy system also tend to address energy 
security and oil dependency concerns. It is very dif-
ficult to quantify these types of innovation benefits 
even after they have occurred, however, never mind 
in advance.
The intention is not to suggest a particular target 
here, which is a complex societal decision that will 
no doubt evolve significantly over time. Rather, it 
is to consider a range of targets that is sufficient to 
give one a sense of the scale of the technical chal-
lenge, in economic terms, that is being considered 
by policymakers. At one end, the European Com-
mission and others have adopted the explicit goal of 
limiting global warming to no more than 2°C above 
preindustrial levels, with an associated long-term 
GHG stabilization target of around 450 ppm CO2e 
(European Commission 2007). Bills introduced in 
the 110th Congress by Senator Sanders (S. 309, 
Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act) and 
Senator Kerry (S. 485, Global Warming Reduction 
Act of 2007) mention the same goal. These targets 
are at the most stringent end of the spectrum indi-
cated toward the left of Figure 1, and there are very 
few modeling results available to gauge the global 
mitigation cost of achieving GHG stabilization be-
low about 530 CO2e (i.e., 450 CO2, or categories 
I and II in Figure 1). One reason is that achiev-
ing long-term stabilization at 450 ppm CO2e will 
almost surely involve overshooting this target in 
the near term, given that current levels are already 
at 450 ppm CO2e, not including aerosols that cur-
rently cool the planet.
At the other end of the spectrum is obviously do-
ing nothing to mitigate GHG emissions. It is use-
ful to consider this option, mainly to point out that 
the value of climate technology innovation is sub-
stantially reduced if there is no intention to reduce 
9. See Schock et al. (1999) for an assessment of the value of energy research in terms of its insurance value against the risks of climate change, 
oil price shocks, urban air pollution, and other energy disruptions.
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 GHG emissions, although it is still unlikely to be 
zero due to co-benefits. However, this is an option 
that virtually all countries have rejected, as indicat-
ed by the 190-plus signatories to the UNFCCC. In 
any event, most policy proposals and certainly most 
analysis has centered on emissions paths that are 
consistent with ultimate stabilization targets in the 
range of 450–550 ppm CO2. (This is as opposed to 
CO2e; recall there is currently an additional 70 ppm 
of CO2e of other GHGs in the atmosphere, which 
are also projected to increase along with CO2.)
One source of recent estimates of the cost of stabili-
zation in this range is the three models participating 
in the U.S. Climate Change Science Program stabi-
lization scenarios study (Clarke et al. 2007).10 Based 
on estimates from that study, the cost of stabilizing 
GHG concentrations at 550 ppm CO2 (670 CO2e) 
is in the range of $3–$30 trillion, or a 0.2–2 per-
cent decrease in the present value of global GDP 
through 2100, depending on the model employed 
(Table 1).11 The cost of a 450 ppm CO2 (530 CO2e) 
stabilization target is about three to five times as 
high in that study; about $15–$90 trillion or a 1–5 
percent decrease in discounted global GDP. Costs 
through 2050 are about half the costs through 
2100.
U.S.-specific GDP losses are not available in that 
study, but allocating 25 percent of the cost to the 
United States implies a present value cost to the 
United States (through 2050) of about $0.1 tril-
lion–$3 trillion (<1 percent of GDP) for the 550 
ppm CO2 target and $2 trillion–$11 trillion (1–3 
percent of GDP) for the 450 ppm CO2 target.12 
Note that these and many other model-based cost 
estimates assume the GHG stabilization target is 
attained at minimum cost by flexibly reducing any 
of the six GHGs (not solely CO2) in the country, 
year, and sector, using the technology that makes 
the most economic sense. In practice, real-world 
10. The three models are (1) the Integrated Global Systems Model (IGSM) of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Joint Program on 
the Science and Policy of Global Change; (2) the Model for Evaluating the Regional and Global Effects (MERGE) of GHG reduction 
policies developed jointly at Stanford University and the Electric Power Research Institute; and (3) the MiniCAM Model of the Joint 
Global Change Research Institute, which is a partnership between the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the University of 
Maryland.
11. Estimates from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum EMF21 assessment of a similar stabilization target found a similar range of costs 
across a larger number of models (Weyant et al. 2006).
12. The allocation of responsibility for the costs of global climate mitigation to individual countries is a complex issue ultimately subject to 
international negotiation and domestic action. Allocating one-fourth of such costs to the United States is based on the average U.S. share 
of global GDP in the assessment models references above. This share is also consistent with the U.S. percentage of a range of estimates of 
past cumulative global GHG emissions (Baumert et al. 2005).
tAble 1
range of estimated Present value Cost of ghg Stabilization
(units as indicated)
 Global   U.s. 25%  Global  U.s. 25% 
GHG stabilization percent  Global  “share” percent  Global “share”  
target decrease  ($ trillions)   ($ trillions) decrease   ($ trillions)    ($ trillions)
450 CO2 (50 CO2e) 1– 8–4 2–11 1–5 16–91 4–2
550 CO2 (60 CO2e) 0–1 0.4–12 0.1– 0.2–2 –0 0.–
source: The estimates are based on results from three models that participated in the U.s. Climate Change science Program GHG stabilization scenario study Clarke et al. 
200. 
Note: Changes in GDP relative to the reference case scenario over the indicated period are discounted to 2010 at a 5 percent discount rate. U.s. GDP is an average of 
roughly 25 percent of global GDP in these scenarios.
 2010–2050 decrease in present value GDP 2010–2100 decrease in present value GDP
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policies and institutions are likely to make costs 
higher, although other assumptions in the models 
could of course implicitly overestimate the costs 
(Newell and Hall 2007).
Economic assessments of various climate bills pend-
ing in the U.S. Congress provide another lens on 
the projected cost of climate mitigation, and thus 
the value of R&D that potentially reduces these 
costs. Two bills that have had the most traction 
are the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act 
of 2008 (S. 2191) and the Low-Carbon Economy 
Act of 2007 (S. 1766, or the Bingaman-Specter bill). 
Both propose to establish a broad-based cap-and-
trade system covering all six GHGs from electric 
power, transportation, and industrial sectors of the 
U.S. economy. S. 2191 targets a 70 percent reduc-
tion of covered emissions from 2005 levels by 2050 
and S. 1766 targets a 60 percent reduction in GHG 
emissions below 2006 levels by 2050, although the 
specific targets in S. 1766 remain constant after 
2030.13 The aggregate amount of GHG emissions 
one might expect will actually be allowed by the 
specific provisions of the bills is likely to be some-
what less stringent than these targets in percentage 
terms, however, because not all emissions are cov-
ered and there are provisions that allow flexibility 
in the targets that one would expect will be used.
Based on RTI International’s ADAGE model, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 
2008a) estimates the cost of the Lieberman-Warner 
bill (S. 2191) would gradually increase over time to 
about a 2.4 percent decrease in U.S. GDP by 2050 
relative to a reference case. The present value of 
this lost GDP (at a 5 percent discount rate) would 
be about $4 trillion, or 1 percent of discounted 
GDP over the 2010–50 period. This is equivalent 
to a constant annualized cost of about $220 bil-
lion per year. It is useful to note EPA also estimates 
that, with adoption of the Lieberman-Warner bill, 
global CO2 concentrations at the end of the cen-
tury would likely be about 500 ppm CO2, assum-
ing certain actions would be undertaken by other 
countries. Scenarios in the same EPA analysis found 
the costs of the policy in terms of reduced GDP 
roughly doubled if the use of nuclear, biomass, and 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) were to be con-
strained (EPA 2008a). In comparison, EPA-estimat-
ed costs are half the level for the Bingaman-Specter 
bill (S. 1766) as for the Lieberman-Warner bill (i.e., 
$2 trillion in discounted GDP loss, 0.5 percent of 
discounted GDP, and about $100 billion per year 
annualized for 2010–50). Analysis by Paltsev et al. 
(2007) of a range of U.S. cap-and-trade proposals 
found comparable costs for policies of similar strin-
gency, with higher costs for more stringent policies 
and lower costs for more modest policies.
In summary, modeling scenarios of cost-effective 
global and U.S. domestic climate mitigation policy 
suggest the cost to the United States of GHG miti-
gation through 2050 could be on the order of $1 
trillion to $10 trillion (<1 to 3 percent) of discount-
ed GDP, or an annualized $50 billion to $500 bil-
lion per year, depending of course on the stringency 
of global and U.S. emissions targets, the share of 
the associated costs borne by the United States, 
and the specific design of policies implemented. 
Longer-term costs through 2100 to achieve GHG 
stabilization at between 450 and 550 ppm CO2 are 
approximately double these amounts. While these 
estimates are subject to numerous economic and 
policy assumptions, they give a sense of the order 
of magnitude of the payoff to the United States of 
innovations that could significantly lower the cost 
of achieving various GHG reduction goals.
13. A White Paper from the U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee staff (2007) states, “A consensus is developing 
that the United States should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 60 to 80 percent by 2050 to contribute to global efforts to stabilize 
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at a CO2-equivalent level between 450 to 550 parts per million.” This is consistent with the 
goal set out by the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (U.S. Climate Action Partnership [USCAP] 2007), a coalition of major U.S. companies 
and environmental organizations. USCAP’s goal is that “Congress should specify an emissions target zone aimed at reducing emissions by 
60% to 80% from current levels by 2050.”
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 2.4. Importance of Advanced 
technology for lowering Costs and 
expanding options
Many studies have demonstrated the central role 
that the availability and cost of advanced ener-
gy technologies plays in determining the cost of 
achieving various GHG emissions targets.14 These 
technical possibilities manifest themselves in two 
important ways in climate modeling: (1) through 
forecasts made about how energy technologies will 
develop and deploy in the absence of climate policy 
(that is, the reference case or baseline technology 
assumptions); and (2) through assumptions about 
how this technological process will (or will not) 
change once the economy is confronted with a par-
ticular emissions or technology policy.
To the first point, the reference case scenarios em-
ployed by virtually all the models used, including 
those cited above, already include significant tech-
nological advance that reduces the baseline level 
of GHG emissions as well as the cost of achiev-
ing reductions relative to that baseline.15 While it 
is not typically made explicit in these models, there 
is presumably a significant degree of innovative ef-
fort in the form of R&D, learning, and diffusion 
of new technologies that would have to underpin 
these baseline technological improvements.
The future availability and cost of advanced energy 
technologies also plays a key role in determining the 
cost of achieving any given GHG emissions target. 
This degree of sensitivity of climate mitigation costs 
to technology development is well established, go-
ing back to early work by Manne and Richels (1992), 
who found the GDP costs of mitigation were ap-
proximately 90 percent lower globally in their op-
timistic technology scenario compared to their cen-
tral case. A more recent study conducted by Clarke 
et al. (2006) explored several alternative advanced 
technology futures and compared the energy, emis-
sions, and economic implications of achieving a 
number of different GHG stabilization scenarios. 
As in other studies, they found that no single tech-
nology or class of technologies is likely to provide 
the scope or quantity of GHG emissions mitigation 
needed to achieve stabilization at the levels exam-
ined. Rather, the cost-effective technology solution 
entails a mix of energy efficiency, low-GHG energy 
supply (including CCS), and emissions reductions 
in non-CO2 GHGs. Thus, R&D supporting such 
a transition must also be broad-based, covering a 
wide range of technological opportunities.
Importantly, Clarke et al. (2006) found that acceler-
ated technology development offers the potential 
to dramatically reduce the costs of stabilization, 
with their advanced technology scenarios reducing 
the cumulative costs of stabilization (present value 
through 2100) by 50 percent or more, yielding eco-
nomic benefits of hundreds of billions to trillions of 
dollars globally (Figure 3). Edmonds et al. (2004) 
similarly found that in future scenarios where a set 
of advanced technologies (e.g., CCS, biotechnol-
ogy, and hydrogen energy systems) are available, 
the cost of GHG mitigation was 60 percent lower 
than a case where these advancements were not 
available. While one might reasonably argue over 
detailed modeling assumptions, these and other 
results demonstrate that technological advance has 
the potential to significantly decrease the costs of 
attaining societal goals for climate change mitiga-
tion. However, two market problems must be ad-
dressed to maximize the likelihood we will harness 
these technological opportunities as efficiently as 
possible. It is important to understand these mar-
ket problems, and the resulting underinvestment in 
14. For recent surveys of the literature and other overviews of modeling methodology, see Clarke and Weyant (2002); Edenhofer et al. (2006); 
Edmonds, Roop, and Scott (2000); Gillingham, Newell, and Pizer (2008); Goulder (2004); Loschel (2002); and Weyant (2004). For dif-
ferent views on possible technological options for GHG stabilization see Hoffert et al. (2002); IPCC (2007); and Pacala and Socolow 
(2004).
15. For example, an analysis by Edmonds et al. (2007, Box 2.3, p. 39) found that in their model the present value cost of achieving stabilization 
at 550 ppm CO2 would be more than $20 trillion greater globally without the reference scenario improvements in technology relative to 
what was available in 2005. These assumed improvements included advanced energy efficiency, hydrogen energy technologies, advanced 
bioenergy, and wind and solar technologies.
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climate mitigation R&D, in order to structure an 
appropriate policy response. It is to these market 
problems that I now turn.
fIgUre 3
Cumulative global mitigation Costs under Alternative technology Scenarios
 
source: Clarke et al. 2006, p. 6.5. 
Note: Concentrations are ppmv of CO2. Levels do not correspond directly to those in Figure 2.
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 3. market Problems, Investment levels, and the role of Public 
Policy
Despite the clear societal benefits of research and innovation for low-GHG technolo-gies, there are two market problems that 
lead to inefficiently low spending in this area: a lack 
of private incentive to adopt low-GHG technolo-
gies, and underinvestment by industry in R&D, es-
pecially basic research. This section describes these 
two problems, provides evidence on the resulting 
patterns of R&D spending in the private and public 
sectors, and finishes by examining the role of public 
policy given these problems within the context of 
the innovation system.
3.1. Innovation market Problems
There are two market problems that lead to inef-
ficiently low investment in climate mitigation R&D 
and must be addressed in order to face our climate 
challenge in the most cost-effective way possible 
(Goulder 2004; Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2005; 
Newell 2007a). First and foremost, there is the en-
vironmental externality of global climate change. If 
firms and households do not have to pay for the 
climate damage imposed by GHG emissions, then 
these emissions will be too high. This has implica-
tions for technology innovation and adoption be-
cause, if there is no demand for GHG reductions, 
then the demand for GHG-reducing technologies 
will also be too low. In turn, there will be insuffi-
cient incentive for companies to invest in mitigation 
technology R&D because there will be little market 
demand for any innovations that might come of it. 
A market-based emissions policy that places a price 
on GHGs—through either a cap-and-trade system 
or an emissions tax—is widely accepted to be a cost-
effective response to this problem.16
The second market problem relates to the public 
good nature of technological innovation. The gains 
from innovative activity are in general difficult for 
firms to appropriate, as the benefits tend to spill over 
to other firms and customers, without full compen-
sation. While intellectual property protection (e.g., 
through the patent system) helps, firms can only 
capture a fraction, and sometimes a small fraction 
of the overall gains from innovation. This market 
problem tends to become greater the farther up in 
the innovative chain one goes, from development, 
to applied research, to basic research. The more 
basic is research the higher is the degree of uncer-
tainty regarding the near-term commercial value 
of any discovery, as well as one’s ultimate ability 
to capture this value through intellectual property 
protection or other means. This public good nature 
of innovation is evidenced in the relatively high so-
cial rate of return to innovation relative to private 
rates that is consistently found by economists (for 
reviews, see Griliches 1995; Hall 1996; and Nadiri 
1993). Typical estimates find the social returns to 
innovation (as measured, for example, by R&D or 
patents) are about two to four times as large as the 
private returns. Others have found similar evidence 
of high social rates of return in the context of new 
knowledge for energy innovations and sulfur scrub-
bing from electric power (Popp 2001, 2003).
While positive knowledge spillovers is a good 
thing—other things being equal—it leads to pri-
vate investment in innovative effort that is too low 
from a broader societal perspective. The problem 
of private sector underinvestment in research may 
be exacerbated in the climate context where the 
incentives for bringing forward new technology 
rest heavily on domestic and international policies 
rather than on natural market forces, and where the 
energy assets involved are often very long lived (so 
technology turns over slowly). Put another way, the 
development of climate-friendly technologies has 
16. See Kopp and Pizer (2007); Metcalf (2007); and Stavins (2007), for overviews of the issues surrounding the design of domestic U.S. GHG 
emissions reductions policies, including the advantages and disadvantages of cap-and-trade relative to emissions taxes.
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diminished market value absent a sustained, cred-
ible government commitment to reducing GHG 
emissions. Finally, R&D focused on technologies 
that will lower the costs of dramatic emissions re-
ductions (e.g., zero-emissions energy technologies 
and associated energy carriers) also serves as a hedge 
against the possibility that new information reveals 
climate impacts at the worst end of the spectrum 
(Baker, Clarke, and Weyant 2006).
3.2. resulting Patterns of r&D: follow 
the money
These environmental and knowledge externalities 
have resulted in underinvestment in climate-friend-
ly energy R&D. However, to appreciate the rela-
tive capacities of the private, public, and nonprofit 
sectors to increase such investments, as well as the 
contrasting capabilities and incentives they face, it 
is imperative to first understand the basics of the 
innovation system.
Technological improvement in the economy 
through the creation and deployment of new prod-
uct and process innovations is one of the most im-
portant underpinnings of economic development as 
well as broader societal prosperity, including envi-
ronmental protection. The set of public and private 
institutions, markets, and governing processes that 
compose this innovation system is complex, and in-
cludes private firms and consortia, their products, 
their production processes, and the markets within 
which they operate; government research institu-
tions and public policies; universities and colleges; 
and other nonprofit research institutions.17
One means of describing the innovation system is to 
follow the money—that is, to summarize the scale 
of R&D resources being spent, where the funding 
comes from, and its use.18 I focus here on R&D 
broadly within the economy and return to discuss 
energy R&D more specifically in §4 below. Current 
estimates are, globally, that nations spend about $1 
trillion each year on R&D, with the vast majority 
of this effort being in the United States and other 
OECD countries (see Table 2; OECD 2008). In-
dustry is by far the largest player in R&D effort, 
funding 63 percent and performing 69 percent of 
R&D globally in 2006 (the most recent year for 
which complete data are available). Government 
is the second-largest funder of R&D globally (30 
percent), about half of which is transferred to uni-
17. See Alic, Mowery, and Rubin (2003) and Norberg-Bohm (2002) for overviews of U.S. technology and innovation policies with lessons for 
energy and climate change.
18. Innovation activities are of course not limited to R&D, but R&D remains one of the few well-tracked indicators of innovative activity. See 
National Science Board (2008, p. 4.10) regarding recent developments in metrics for innovation-related activities.
tAble 2
International r&D expenditures in 2006 (units as indicated)
 ($ billions) Industry Government Industry Universities Government (million FTEs)
  United states 40 66 28 1 14 11 1.4
  Total OECD 818 64 0 69 1 11 .9
  Non-OECD* 144 61 2 69 10 20 1.9
  world* 962 6 0 69 16 1 5.9
source: OECD 2008, National science Board 2008 for U.s. figures. 
*Non-OECD total covers only select non-OECD countries and thus the non-OECD and world totals may represent underestimates; however, almost all R&D occurs in the 
included countries. 
Note: Non-U.s. totals are based on purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates.
  Region All sources         Percent financed by          Percent performed by                     Total  
       researchers 
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 versities, other nonprofit research institutions, and 
industry who perform the associated R&D within 
a system of contracts, grants, and other arrange-
ments.
The overall shares of the $340 billion in R&D ex-
penditures in the United States in 2006 are similar to 
the global averages, with industry funding about two-
thirds ($223 billion) and performing 70 percent of all 
U.S. R&D (Table 2). Overall, U.S. R&D has recently 
averaged about 2.6 percent of GDP, and industry 
R&D has averaged 3.7 percent of net sales (National 
Science Board 2008). The U.S. federal government is 
the second-largest funder of R&D, providing about 
28 percent of total funding in 2006, but most of the 
associated research is carried out outside the govern-
ment (Table 3). Besides industry, other key perform-
ers of U.S. R&D include universities and colleges (14 
percent), the federal government itself (7 percent), 
government-funded labs or federally funded research 
and development centers (FFRDCs; 4 percent), and 
other nonprofit research institutions (4 percent).
In addition to these overall funding levels, it is 
equally important for policy purposes to under-
stand the composition of R&D—that is, for what 
type of efforts these resources are spent. To get a 
handle on the character of this work, the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and other agencies di-
vide R&D into three traditional baskets: basic re-
search, applied research, and development (Figure 
4). Although these categories have been criticized as 
being overly simplistic and reinforcing of the idea 
that innovation is a linear process—rather than one 
with complex interrelationships and feedbacks—
they are nonetheless indicative of a pattern, and in 
fact the only manner in which data of this type are 
routinely collected. Moreover, §5.1 argues that an 
important role for federal funding in GHG mitiga-
tion research is in the realm of what could be called 
strategic or use-inspired basic research, which is re-
search that seeks knowledge and fundamental un-
derstanding, but is inspired and guided by practical 
needs related to GHG mitigation (Figure 5).
tAble 3 
U.S. 2006 r&D, by funding and Performing Sectors ($ billions unless otherwise noted)
                                              source of funds  
  Performing       Percent by 
  sector All sources Industry Federal government U&C Other nonprofits  performer
  R&D 40.4 22.4 94.2 12.4 10.5 100
    Industry 242.1 219.6 22.6 — — 1
    Industry-administered  
    FFRDCs 2.4 — 2.4 — — 1
    Federal government 24.4 — 24.4 — — 
    U&C 46.6 2.5 28.5 12.4 . 14
    U&C–administered  
    FFRDCs . — . — — 2
    Other nonprofit  
    institutions 14. 1. 5. — .2 4
    Nonprofit- 
    administered FFRDCs 2.8 — 2.8 — — 1
    Percent by funding  
    source 100 66 28 4  
source: National science Board 2008. 
FFRDC = federally funded research and development center; U&C = universities and colleges; — = negligible funds.
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fIgUre 4
Stages of r&D: Common Definitions
  r&D. According to international guidelines for conducting R&D surveys, R&D comprises creative 
work “undertaken on a systematic basis to increase the stock of knowledge . . . and the use of this 
stock of knowledge to devise new applications.” (OECD 2002, 0).
  basic research. The objective of basic research is to gain more comprehensive knowledge or 
understanding of the subject under study without specific applications in mind. Although basic 
research may not have specific applications as its goal, it can be directed in fields of present or 
potential interest. This is often the case with basic research performed by industry or mission-driven 
federal agencies.
  Applied research. The objective of applied research is to gain knowledge or understanding to meet 
a specific, recognized need. In industry, applied research includes investigations to discover new 
scientific knowledge that has specific commercial objectives with respect to products, processes, or 
services.
  Development. Development is the systematic use of the knowledge or understanding gained from 
research directed toward the production of useful materials, devices, systems, or methods, including 
the design and development of prototypes and processes.
 source: National science Board 2008, p. 4.9.
fIgUre 5 
An Alternative Conception of research: “Use-inspired” basic research
source: Based on stokes 199.
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 U.S. R&D is dominated by funds for the develop-
ment of new and improved products, processes, and 
services by industry, which funded 83 percent and 
performed 90 percent of all U.S. development in 
2006 (Table 4; National Science Board 2008). One 
sees a similar picture with federal funding for de-
fense-related activities, where 89 percent of R&D 
funds go for development (National Science Board 
2008). In cases like defense where the government 
is both the funder and the ultimate customer, there 
tAble 4
U.S. 2006 r&D expenditures by funder and Stage
(units as indicated)
 
                                                                                                stage
   Funder Total R&D Basic research Applied research Development
Total ($ billions) 40.4 61.5 4. 204.
   Percent funded by stage  18 22 60
Industry ($ billions) 22.4 10.6 44.0 168.8
   Percent funded by stage  5 20 6
   Percent funded of total stage  1 59 8
Government ($ billions) 94.2 6.2 24.9 .2
   Percent funded by stage  8 26 5
   Percent funded of total stage  59  16
U&C ($ billions) 12.4 8.5 .1 0.
   Percent funded by stage  69 25 6
   Percent funded of total stage  14 4 0
Other nonprofits ($ billions) 10.5 6. 2. 1.6
   Percent funded by stage  60 25 15
   Percent funded of total stage   10 4 1
source: National science Board 2008. 
U&C = universities and colleges.
is a clear dominance of development activities in 
the R&D mix.
In contrast, at the other end of the spectrum the 
federal government is the primary source of U.S. 
funds for basic research, contributing 59 percent 
(National Science Board 2008, Table 4). In fact, the 
vast majority (about 85 percent) of nondefense fed-
eral R&D funds go to basic and applied research 
(OMB 2008 [Table 9.8 in Historical Tables, and 
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Analytical Perspectives]; DOE 2008b). More than 
half (56 percent) of all basic research is conducted 
at universities and colleges (National Science Board 
2008), with other nonprofits conducting most of the 
remainder (24 percent).
In addition to creating new knowledge on which 
further technological development can draw, uni-
versity-based R&D supports the production of 
young researchers through strong ties to graduate 
training and research. Most of these researchers 
eventually move into the private sector, represent-
ing an important link within the overall innovation 
system. More than half of R&D expenditures (54 
percent) are in fact for labor, including wages and 
fringe benefits (NSF 2007b, Table 7). Therefore, 
ensuring a stream of scientists, engineers, and other 
research professionals trained in areas relevant to 
clean energy technologies will be an important ele-
ment in increasing the necessary innovative effort 
and moderating its cost.
3.3. the Appropriate focus of Public 
Policies and Investments
Although it may have low short-term returns to in-
dividual firms, basic research can have high returns 
to society over the long run by building the intel-
lectual capital that lays the groundwork for future 
advances in technology. This economic feature of 
the innovation system is the principal explanation 
for the emphasis by industry on development rela-
tive to basic research, as well as the rationale for 
focusing nondefense federal spending on basic and 
applied research rather than on activities nearer to 
commercialization. When confronted with limited 
resources, it is sensible for government policy to fo-
cus first and foremost on the part of the innovation 
problem least likely to be addressed adequately by 
the private sector.
In addition, by virtue of its critical role in the higher 
education system, public R&D funding will contin-
ue to be important in training researchers and engi-
neers with the skills necessary to work in either the 
public or private sectors to produce GHG-reducing 
technology innovations. By supporting graduate 
and postdoctoral students, public funding for uni-
versity-based research will expand the economy’s 
capacity to generate scientific advances, technology 
innovations, and productivity improvements in the 
future. This linkage has made research funding a 
priority among many who are concerned about the 
long-term competitiveness of the U.S. economy 
and has led to a recent increase in political support 
for expanded spending—especially on physical sci-
ences and engineering.
Overall, public funding for precommercial research 
therefore tends to receive widespread support 
among experts based on the significant positive 
spillovers typically associated with the generation 
of new knowledge. Agreement over the appropri-
ate role of public policy in technology development 
tends to weaken, however, as one moves from sup-
port for R&D to support for large-scale demonstra-
tion projects, and particularly to deployment. (See 
Newell [2007b] for a discussion of issues surround-
ing technology deployment policy.) Economists 
and other experts generally see clear justification 
for a government role in supporting research, but 
much weaker rationales for government interven-
tion in the realms of technology commercialization 
and widespread deployment.
In situations where there is a missing market for the 
technology—as is the case for GHG reductions—
climate policy that places a price on emissions can 
serve as the most cost-effective means of encourag-
ing technology deployment. Frustration with the 
current level of private sector investment in GHG-
mitigation technologies should not be taken as an 
indication the government needs to step in and 
provide this investment directly, but rather as an 
indication that the private sector should be given an 
incentive to do so. Once broad-based GHG emis-
sions policy is in place, many of the existing gaps 
in green investment currently evident will be filled 
by the private sector. If specific technology deploy-
ment market problems remain even after a GHG 
emissions price is in place for some time, specific 
policies can be evaluated to target these problems. 
A U.S. InnovAtIon StrAtegy for ClImAte ChAnge mItIgAtIon
22 THE HAMILTON PROJECT  |   THE BROOkINGs INsTITUTION
 A complete discussion of role and design of tech-
nology deployment policies is, however, beyond the 
scope of this paper.19 
Technology demonstration projects occupy a mid-
dle ground between R&D and deployment. Argu-
ments for public support of technology demonstra-
tion projects tend to point to the large expense; high 
degree of technical, market, and regulatory risk; and 
inability of private firms to capture the rewards from 
designing and constructing first-of-a-kind facilities 
(Newell 2007a). Most compelling from an econom-
ic perspective, there may be knowledge generated 
in the process of undertaking first-of-a-kind dem-
onstration projects—which can help improve the 
design of future technology, lower technical risks, 
and serve as a basis for well-designed regulations—
but profits from this knowledge may not be appro-
priable by individual firms. Conversely, caution is 
required because, despite good intentions, the most 
notable failures in government energy R&D fund-
ing (e.g., the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, Clinch 
River Breeder Reactor) tend to be associated with 
large-scale demonstration projects—using up large 
portions of limited R&D budgets in the process 
(Cohen and Noll 1991). The recent experience 
with the FutureGen Initiative for clean-coal power 
tends to reinforce this perspective.20 In sum, while it 
should not be the focus of climate mitigation inno-
vation investments by the public sector, there may 
be a compelling rationale for well-designed pub-
lic support for a limited number of first-of-a-kind 
mitigation technology demonstration projects, so 
long as the purpose is the generation of substantial 
new knowledge (as opposed to meeting production 
or deployment targets).
Finally, growing attention has turned to the possible 
role of international technology-oriented agree-
ments as part of the architecture of international cli-
mate-change policy, including as a key component 
of the “Bali Roadmap” discussions leading up to the 
post-2012 successor to the Kyoto Protocol (New-
ell 2008). Technology-oriented agreements can be 
aimed at advancing knowledge sharing and coordi-
nation, joint R&D, technology transfer, or deploy-
ment of technologies—in contrast with agreements 
framed primarily in terms of emissions targets, such 
as the Kyoto Protocol (de Coninck et al. 2008). In-
terest in these efforts is attributable to a number of 
factors, generally related to the idea that if we can 
lower the costs of mitigation technologies, the like-
lihood of significant GHG reductions by countries 
will be higher. Agreements to further R&D can in-
crease international exchange of scientific and tech-
nical information as well as the cost effectiveness 
of R&D through cost sharing and reduced dupli-
cation of effort. Provisions for technology transfer, 
conversely, are driven primarily by a need to help 
developing countries follow a less-GHG-intensive 
development path by providing access to climate-
friendly technologies and the funding to cover their 
additional cost. As such, technology-transfer efforts 
can help to increase incentives for developing coun-
try participation in climate-mitigation agreements 
and, at the same time, advance goals beyond global 
climate mitigation (e.g., economic development 
and local air quality).
19. A number of specific market problems have been suggested as rationales for technology deployment policies. These market problems 
include information problems related to energy-efficiency investment decisions, knowledge spillovers from learning during deployment, 
asymmetric information between project developers and lenders, network effects in large integrated systems, and incomplete insurance 
markets for liability associated with specific technologies (Newell 2007b). Although such problems are often cited in justifying deployment 
policies, these policies in practice often go much farther in promoting particular technologies than a response to a legitimate market prob-
lem would require. Therefore, while conceptually sound rationales may exist for implementing these policies in specific circumstances, 
economists and others tend to be skeptical that many of them, as actually proposed and implemented, would provide a cost-effective 
addition to market-based emissions policies. Critics also point out deployment policies intended to last only during the early stages of 
commercialization and deployment often create vested interests that make the policies difficult to end.
20. Federal government funding for the FutureGen Initiative—a $1.5 billion demonstration plant for producing electricity and hydrogen 
from coal while capturing GHG emissions—was recently completely reconfigured by  the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) after many 
years of planning to instead emphasize support of early commercial demonstration of carbon capture at multiple commercial-scale ad-
vanced coal-based electric power plants.
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21. See, for example, Kopp and Pizer (2007); Metcalf (2007); and Stavins (2007), and the other works cited therein.
22. The USCAP companies include Alcan, Alcoa, American International Group (AIG), Boston Scientific, BP America, Caterpillar, Chrysler 
LLC, ConocoPhillips, Deere, Dow Chemical, Duke Energy, DuPont, Exelon, Ford, FPL Group, General Electric, General Motors, 
Johnson & Johnson, Marsh, Inc., NRG Energy, PepsiCo, PG&E, PNM Resources, Rio Tinto, Shell, Siemens, and Xerox.
The first part of a cost-effective innovation strategy for climate change mitigation should be to harness the power, efficiency, and flex-
ibility of the private sector. To align private incen-
tives with the public interest, both environmental 
and knowledge externalities must be addressed. 
This section thus recommends a comprehensive 
emissions pricing system reinforced by permanent 
R&D tax credits, tackling both market problems 
head on.
4.1. emissions Pricing Would encourage 
energy Innovation and Cost-effective 
Deployment
There are many excellent treatments of the advan-
tages of economywide, long-term, market-based 
emissions pricing for climate policy; U.S. legisla-
tive proposals with the most traction have embraced 
this approach.21 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile em-
phasizing that establishing a GHG emissions price 
through either a tax or cap-and-trade system is es-
sential from a technology perspective for two closely re-
lated reasons: First because the GHG price attaches 
a financial cost to GHGs and—just as people will 
consume less of something that carries a price than 
they will of something given away for free—will in-
duce households and firms to buy technologies with 
lower GHG emissions (a more efficient appliance, 
for example). Moreover, the GHG price does not 
encourage just any technology adoption, but rather 
specifically guides the adoption of the most cost-
effective technologies for reducing emissions by 
sending a consistent financial signal to households 
and businesses.
The second reason the GHG price is essential from 
a technology perspective follows from the first be-
cause the emissions price creates a demand-driven, 
profit-based incentive for the private sector to invest 
effort in developing new, lower-cost climate-friend-
ly innovations. Market-demand pull will encourage 
manufacturers to invest in R&D and other innova-
tive efforts to bring new lower-GHG technologies 
to market, just as they do for other products and 
processes. Economists have investigated this pro-
cess of induced innovation for many years in the 
context of a broad set of industries, and more recent 
evidence supports the inducement mechanism spe-
cifically in the context of environmental and energy 
technology innovation in response to increases in 
cost of energy and environmental emissions (for 
surveys, see Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2003; and 
Popp, Newell, and Jaffe 2008). Members of the 
U.S. Climate Action Partnership [USCAP]—a co-
alition of major U.S. companies and environmental 
organizations—agreed when they concluded, “The 
most efficient and powerful way to stimulate private 
investment in research, development, and deploy-
ment is to adopt policies establishing a market value 
for GHG emissions over the long term” (USCAP 
2007, 5).22
For market-based GHG emissions policy to pro-
vide an effective inducement to innovation, how-
ever, it is critical that the policy be credible to the 
private sector over the long term. Given the some-
times-substantial time lags between initial discov-
ery and profitable market penetration, companies 
must be confident there will indeed be sufficient 
demand once their innovations reach the market. It 
is therefore critical for policymakers to put in place 
GHG emissions pricing policies whose stringency 
is spelled out for many decades in advance, and that 
provides stable financial incentives across a wide 
array of technological solutions. An economywide 
4. Inducing Private Sector Innovation through a market-based 
Price on ghgs, reinforced by Permanent r&D tax Credits
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 cap-and-trade system or carbon tax, with no expi-
ration date, increasingly stringent targets specified 
through 2050, and an architecture with sufficient 
flexibility to adjust over time, should be able to pro-
vide this credibility. Under a cap-and-trade system, 
allowance prices and corresponding financial incen-
tives for technology can also be stabilized through 
flexibility over time (i.e., through emissions bank-
ing and borrowing) and provisions for price floors 
and price ceilings on emissions allowances (Murray, 
Newell, and Pizer forthcoming; Newell, Pizer, and 
Zhang 2005).23 By setting out a long-term emis-
sions pricing policy designed to provide stable and 
increasing incentive for GHG mitigation, policy-
makers will set in motion the most critical element 
of a robust climate innovation strategy.
4.2. Permanent r&D tax Credits Would 
reinforce Private Innovation Incentives
While private sector incentives for innovation are 
supported by intellectual property protection, se-
crecy, and other means, there is still a substantial 
portion of the benefits of innovation that cannot 
be captured by innovating firms. This leads to a ge-
neric argument in favor of R&D tax incentives to 
boost the level of private R&D. The U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code provides for two types of R&D tax 
incentives—tax credits and expensing.24 Both apply 
generally, though not solely, to energy- or climate-
related R&D and both give firms incentives to ex-
pand research beyond what they would otherwise 
undertake by reducing the after-tax cost of R&D in-
vestments. Section 41 of the tax code allows firms to 
claim tax credits for extra expenditures on research 
and experimentation; thus, it is officially known as 
the R&E, as opposed to R&D, tax credit. In ad-
dition, §174 provides for an expensing exception, 
whereby the taxpayer may treat R&D expenditures 
as current expenses, rather than charging them to a 
capital account that would be amortized only over 
a longer period of time.
The tax credit provided under §41 amounts to 20 
percent of qualified research expenditures beyond 
a firm’s baseline level (based on historical research 
expenditures or an alternative method), with a 
separate threshold for payments to universities and 
other nonprofits for basic research.25 The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 also made a change to the R&D 
tax credit with potential importance for energy and 
climate technology innovation: corporate payments 
for energy research to universities, federal labora-
tories, eligible small businesses, and certain energy 
research consortia (such as the Electric Power Re-
search Institute) are now eligible for a 20 percent 
credit, with no threshold (i.e., it applies to all, and 
not solely incremental, expenditures). Because the 
credit has no threshold, it is more generous than the 
other types of R&D tax credits.
The U.S. Treasury estimates the annual cost of the 
R&D expensing and tax credit incentives at about 
$5 billion each (OMB 2008 [Analytical Perspec-
tives]); it is unclear how much of this supports en-
ergy-related R&D.26 Overall, econometric studies 
have found the tax credit is effective in the sense 
that private sector research spending has increased 
roughly one-for-one with each dollar of tax credit 
extended (Hall and Van Reenan 2000). R&D tax 
23. Some have criticized price ceilings on allowances, arguing they would weaken or eliminate incentives for private sector innovation and in-
vestment in clean technologies. However, this argument is flawed. Curtailing the possibility of very high allowances prices would certainly 
not eliminate the incentive for clean technology innovation and adoption, although it may curtail the incentive to do so for very expensive 
technologies that would only be competitive above the ceiling price. Assuming the ceiling price is set appropriately, however, this is desir-
able because environmental policies should not seek, from an economic perspective, to promote technology at any cost. Rather, policies 
should induce an efficient amount of innovation and adoption, consistent with societal willingness to pay (Kerr and Newell 2003).
24. For general background and recent legislative proposals, see Guenther (2008).
25. Qualified expenses include in-house salaries and supplies, certain time-sharing costs for computer use, and contract research performed 
by certain nonprofit research organizations. Moreover, these expenses must be incurred in the process of discovering new information the 
taxpayer could use to develop new products or processes.
26. Permanent extension of the Research and Experimentation tax credit is estimated to cost $51 billion in tax expenditures over the period 
2009–13 and $133 billion over the period 2009–18 (OMB 2008b, p. 266).
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credits have the advantage of encouraging private 
efforts to advance technology while leaving to in-
dustry the specific R&D decisions and judgments 
about the most productive areas for investment, 
given both economic and regulatory incentives. As 
a result, there is less need for policy intervention in 
the market and for government to attempt to “pick 
winners.” Tax credits have other advantages over 
alternative R&D–funding mechanisms: they create 
less of an administrative burden, obviate the need 
to target individual firms for assistance, and can be 
made permanent (and in that case not subject to 
inconsistent annual appropriations).
Nonetheless, several factors have limited the over-
all impact of the existing R&D tax credit. First, 
the credit was originally added to the tax code as a 
temporary measure; consequently, it has had to be 
renewed more than ten times, often with modifica-
tions. Most recently, the credit expired at the end 
of 2007 and was not extended until October 2008, 
when it was retroactively extended until the end of 
2009 as part of the Emergency Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 2008. This uncertainty makes long-range 
research planning based on tax considerations dif-
ficult and has led many to call for making the R&D 
tax credit permanent. Tax credits are also ineffective 
in situations where a firm has little taxable income, 
which can be particularly problematic for encourag-
ing R&D by small startup firms. Various reforms to 
the credit have been proposed to address these and 
other concerns, such as the definition of qualified 
research expenses and the thresholds above which 
the expenses become eligible.27
In the context of climate policy, a primary short-
coming of a tax credit approach is the difficulty 
of targeting R&D efforts that are particularly rel-
evant to GHG mitigation. The recent modification 
of the existing credit to include contributions for 
energy research to universities, federal labs, and 
certain small businesses and research consortia ad-
dresses this issue to some extent. In addition, some 
groups (such as the National Commission on En-
ergy Policy [2004]) have recommended tax credits 
be increased for technologies aimed at improving 
end-use efficiency or otherwise reducing GHG 
emissions. While it would be difficult for Congress 
and the Treasury to develop workable qualification 
rules for an augmented R&D tax credit that would 
focus specifically on efforts relevant for GHG miti-
gation, the recent provisions specific to energy re-
search suggest it may be feasible in part.
A sensible approach is to make the R&D tax credit 
permanent.28 After the special energy-related pro-
visions have been in place for several years (e.g., 
2010), the National Academy of Sciences should 
evaluate the effectiveness of these provisions in 
boosting energy research and should make recom-
mendations regarding the continued appropriate-
ness of the provisions and potential modification to 
further increase innovation relevant to GHG miti-
gation and other energy goals. Nonetheless, despite 
their value, private sector tax credits for R&D only 
increase incentives for the type of R&D that firms 
are naturally inclined to undertake. R&D tax cred-
its must therefore be complemented by increased 
public funding for the types of innovative effort the 
private sector is least likely to undertake—namely, 
innovative effort focused primarily on targeted 
basic research inspired by mitigation technology 
needs.
4.3. Impact of Private Sector Innovation 
Incentives: Who Will respond?
It is difficult to pin down exactly how much and 
what type of innovation is likely to be generated 
by a GHG emissions price and a permanent R&D 
27. It has also proved difficult in practice to distinguish expenses that qualify for the credit from other expenses; moreover, under current 
rules, eligible expenditures are quite restricted. Even if research is considered qualified, related expenses such as overhead and equipment 
costs are not covered (although certain equipment costs are eligible for accelerated depreciation). See Guenther (2008) for other related 
issues.
28. Ideally, the tax credit would be, at the same time, subject to appropriate reforms, including those related to issues described above. The 
details of such reforms are, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
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 tax credit, but the innovation is sure to come from 
a wide array of businesses currently engaged in the 
development and use of energy producing and con-
suming technologies, especially in the provision of 
electricity and transportation services. It will also 
come from the agro-biotech sector (assuming 
there are incentives for biological sequestration), 
from companies that produce and consume other 
non-CO2 GHGs (e.g., chemical companies), and 
less obvious sectors such as information technolo-
gies (e.g., in the context of energy management and 
conservation).
However, estimates suggest private sector invest-
ments in energy R&D have fallen by more than half 
in real terms from a peak of more than $5 billion per 
year circa 1980 to about $2 billion per year in 2004, 
in tandem with declines in energy prices and federal 
energy R&D spending (National Commission on 
Energy Policy 2004; NSF 2002, 2007b). Nonethe-
less, while the trend was clearly downward over this 
period, private sector R&D investments relevant to 
energy technology are extremely difficult to assess 
(see, e.g., President’s Council of Advisers on Sci-
ence and Technology 1997). These estimates pro-
vide a poor indication of the overall level of private 
sector R&D investment that could and likely will 
be brought to bear on the climate technology chal-
lenge. Other studies (Margolis and Kammen 1999; 
Nemet and Kammen 2007) suggest an alarmingly 
low (e.g., <0.5 percent) R&D intensity—or ratio 
of company-funded R&D to net sales—of the en-
ergy sector relative to the average R&D intensity 
of R&D–performing industries, which has been 3.7 
percent in recent years (National Science Board 
2008). The definition of the energy sector R&D in-
tensity used in such comparisons appears inappro-
priate, however, and the comparisons themselves 
across widely different sectors can be misleading 
(Sagar 2000).
To the contrary, many of the industrial sectors and 
individual companies that are likely to be most en-
gaged in creating the innovations necessary to re-
duce GHG emissions have substantial R&D bud-
gets and R&D intensities within the typical range of 
R&D-performing companies. This is illustrated in 
Table 5, which shows the 2006 R&D expenditures 
for a subset of the 1,250 companies that globally 
had the highest R&D levels (U.K. Department for 
Innovation, Universities and Skills 2007). The table 
focuses only on sectors and specific U.S. companies 
that have the highest relevance to GHG mitiga-
tion.
The list in Table 5 includes producers of transpor-
tation technologies such as Ford, General Motors, 
and Boeing, with individual company R&D budgets 
measured in billions of dollars per year and a global 
R&D budget for the automotive sector of $80 bil-
lion annually. General Electric—which produces a 
wide array of energy-producing and energy-con-
suming products, from light bulbs to gas turbines 
and train engines—has an annual R&D budget of 
about $3 billion. Chemical and agro-biotech com-
panies, such as DuPont, Dow, and Monsanto, each 
has R&D budgets near or above $1 billion per year, 
and will no doubt be active in finding substitutes for 
GHGs and in engineering low-GHG biofuel alter-
natives. While elements of the energy sector focused 
on fossil fuel extraction (e.g., oil and gas companies) 
have relatively low R&D intensities, they still have 
substantial R&D budgets in aggregate. Further-
more, elements of the oil services sector that are 
likely to be important for geologic carbon storage, 
such as Schlumberger, spend hundreds of millions 
of dollars annually on R&D and have higher R&D 
intensities than the large oil companies.
In addition, there are the many smaller firms and 
start-up companies that have benefited from a re-
cent surge in venture capital investment in clean 
energy technology. There was about $350 million 
in early-stage venture capital investment for clean 
energy in the United States in 2007, approximately 
double the prior year and starting from a negligible 
level just ten years ago.29 While relatively small, such 
companies can be an important source of produc-
29. Author’s analysis based on data from the Thomson Financial VentureXpert database. Other estimates of clean energy venture capital 
investment, which tend to be much higher, include large amounts of funding for expansion and later-stage financing.
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tAble 5
r&D of Select Sectors and U.S. Companies Active in Climate-relevant technology, 2006
(units as indicated)
Company r&D ($ millions)  (percent of sales)
All sectors (1,250 top companies globally) 48,129 .5
Aerospace & defense (9 top companies globally) 21,160 4.9
  Boeing ,262 5.
  United Technologies 1,51 .2
Automotive (8 top companies globally) 80,284 4.1
  Ford ,210  4.5
  General Motors 6,609  .2
  Delphi 2,10 8.0
  Visteon 595 5.2
  Johnson Controls 421 1.
Chemicals (91 top companies globally) 22,41 .1
  DuPont 1,04 4.
  Dow 1,166 2.4
  Monsanto 26 9.9
Construction and materials (2 top companies globally) 2,4 0.9
  Owens Corning 60 0.9
  Lennox 42 1.1
Electricity (16 top companies globally) 2,918 0.9
Electronic and electrical equipment (102 top companies globally) 5,150 4.5
  Agilent Technologies 656 12.8
  Danaher 44 4.6
General industrials (6 top companies globally) 11,58 2.1
  General Electric 2,9 1.8
  Honeywell 1,41 4.5
Household goods (24 top companies globally) 5,011 2.
  whirlpool 429 2.
Industrial engineering (0 top companies globally) 11, 2.
  Caterpillar 1,49 .2
  Deere 2 .
Industrial metals (2 top companies globally) ,201 0.8
  Alcoa 21 0.
Oil and gas (18 companies globally) 6,465 0.
  ExxonMobil 4 0.2
  Chevron 469 0.2
Oil equipment services and distribution (10 companies globally) 1,48 1.9
  schlumberger 620 .2
source: selected from the R&D Scorecard’s 1,250 companies globally with the highest R&D expenditures (U.k. Department for Innovation, Universities and skills 200). 
Note: specific U.s. companies listed had R&D expenditures above $400 million in 2006, with the exception of Owens Corning, Lennox, and Alcoa, which also were 
included. R&D includes amounts funded by only the companies themselves, not by the government or others under contract. Based on OECD international R&D data 
(Table 2), these 1,250 companies account for about 80 percent of global industry R&D.
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 tive innovative effort (Kortum and Lerner 2000).
The overall level of energy investment expected 
over the next few decades provides another indica-
tion of the scale of relevant private sector invest-
ment. The IEA in its most recent assessment of 
energy investment projects that about $22 trillion 
of investment in energy-supply infrastructure will 
be needed over the 2006–30 period, or almost $900 
billion annually on average (IEA 2007b). Note this 
does not include investment in energy demand-
side technologies (e.g., transportation, appliances, 
and equipment) which measure in the trillions of 
dollars each year. Assuming the level of associated 
private R&D investment is measured in terms of a 
few percent of sales, as is typical, this implies private 
sector innovative efforts on energy-related technol-
ogies measured in tens of billions of dollars per year. 
This is consistent with a recent IEA (2008) estimate 
placing current global private sector spending on 
energy technologies at $40 billion–$60 billion an-
nually, far exceeding public sector energy spending 
of about $10 billion annually.
Three main messages emerge from the discussion 
thus far. First, there is substantial R&D capacity in 
the principal sectors and companies that purchas-
ers of energy technologies will turn to for lower-
GHG alternatives. Past evidence both broadly in 
the economy and specifically in the energy sector 
indicates this private sector innovative capacity 
will be directed to developing and commercializ-
ing low-GHG technologies—if there is a financial 
incentive provided by increased demand due to a 
price on GHGs. The second message is that the 
private sector level of R&D spending on relevant 
products and processes is likely to be so substan-
tial that, if private sector profit incentives are not 
clearly aligned with societal GHG reduction goals, 
then any public R&D spending will likely be push-
ing against an insurmountable tide. Finally, the 
recognition that the private sector has substantial 
resources for innovation, as well as the incentive to 
focus on very applied research and especially devel-
opment and deployment, suggests public funding 
should complement these efforts by prioritizing 
targeted basic research rather than substituting for 
or duplicating private innovative activities.
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While it is imperative to harness the pri-vate sector capacity for climate mitiga-tion R&D, this alone would be an in-
sufficient climate change innovation strategy. This 
section examines the rationale for further govern-
ment support of strategic basic research inspired 
by climate technology needs and proposes a plan 
to efficiently increase spending. To ensure existing 
and additional resources are efficiently employed, it 
also emphasizes the need for an effective manage-
ment and coordination strategy. Finally, it proposes 
increased use of innovation inducement prizes for 
targeted technological breakthroughs.
5.1. background: Increased federal 
funding for ghg mitigation research 
Would Usefully Complement Private 
Innovation efforts
While private sector effort dominates overall R&D 
spending and performance—particularly for prod-
uct and process development—government funding 
of research is a significant and essential component 
of the overall innovation system, including the role 
it plays in training future researchers. Universities, 
other nonprofits, and federal labs perform more 
than 85 percent of U.S. basic research, more than 
half (59 percent) of which is funded by the federal 
government (National Science Board 2008). Leg-
islative and executive branch policymakers must 
therefore make decisions on how much to spend on 
federal R&D, where to spend it, and how to manage 
this research portfolio.
The U.S. federal R&D budget was $135 billion in 
2007, 60 percent of which went for defense and 40 
percent for nondefense R&D (Table 6).30 More 
than half (54 percent) of federal nondefense R&D 
spending went for health-related research through 
5. Complementing Private Innovation through effective 
expansion of federal resources for Climate mitigation r&D
the National Institutes of Health, with space re-
search and technology (NASA) and general science 
(NSF) commanding the second- and third-largest 
components at 15 percent ($8.3 billion) and 7 per-
cent ($4.0 billion) of nondefense R&D, respective-
ly. Whereas the R&D budget managed by the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) totaled almost $8 
billion, only about half of this total was for energy-
related research ($3.9 billion), with the remainder 
going to nonenergy basic research (e.g., biological, 
environmental, nuclear physics, and defense-re-
lated research).
Thus, publicly funded energy research constitutes 
about 7 percent of the nondefense and 3 percent 
of the total federal R&D budget (or less than 0.03 
percent of GDP). This includes applied research 
within the DOE program offices (Energy Efficien-
cy and Renewable Energy, Fossil Energy, Nuclear 
Energy, and Electricity Delivery and Energy Reli-
ability), as well as basic science research conducted 
through the DOE Office of Science programs on 
Fusion Energy Sciences and Basic Energy Sciences 
(e.g., materials science and engineering, chemistry, 
geosciences, and biological energy sciences). See 
Table 7.
To place this in some perspective, health expendi-
tures accounted for 16 percent of U.S. GDP in 2006 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
2008), energy expenditures accounted for 8 percent 
of U.S. GDP in 2005 (EIA 2008a), and agriculture 
accounted for about 1 percent of U.S. GDP in 2004 
(World Bank 2007). The most significant trend in 
recent years in federal R&D spending has been 
the large rise in health-related R&D, which has 
increased from 25 percent ($8 billion in real 2007 
dollars) of the federal nondefense R&D budget in 
1980 to 54 percent ($29 billion) in 2007 (OMB 
30. Note that there is a significant discrepancy between federal R&D funding levels reported in R&D surveys (Table 3 and Table 4) and in the 
federal budget (Table 6). See National Science Board (2008) for discussion of this discrepancy.
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 tAble 6 
U.S. federal budget for r&D by Agency and Stage (fy2007)
($ billions unless otherwise noted)
 Percent  total basic Applied 
Agency of total r&D r&D research research Development
Dept. of Health and Human services  21   29.0   15.6   1.4   — 
National Aeronautics and space Administration  6   8.   1.8   0.9   5.6 
National science Foundation     4.0   .6   0.4   — 
Dept. of Energy (energy-related)     .9   1.5   1.2   1.2 
Dept. of Energy (other non-defense)  1   1.6   1.6   —   — 
Dept. of Agriculture  2   2.2   0.9   1.1   0.2 
Other agencies  4   4.8   0.8   .2   0.8 
Non-defense total  40   5.6   25.8   20.1   . 
Percent of non-defense R&D by stage   100   48   8   14 
Dept. of Defense  58   8.   1.5   5.1   1.6 
Dept. of Homeland security  1   1.1   0.2   0.4   0.4 
Dept. of Energy (defense-related)  2   2.   —   1.5   0.8 
Defense total  60   81.   1.8   .0   2.9 
Percent of defense R&D by stage    100   2   9   89 
Total federal R&D  100   15.   2.6   2.1   80.6 
Percent of total R&D by stage    100   20   20   60 
source: OMB 2008a, 2008b; DOE 2008b. 
— = negligible funds. 
Note: Applied research and development spending for DOE energy-related research is apportioned equally based on data for FY2006.
tAble 7 
energy r&D budget for U.S. Department of energy
($ millions)
 FY 2006  FY 200  FY 2008 FY 2009  
Office actual actual estimate request
Energy efficiency and renewable energy  82   1,156   1,420   1,15 
Electricity transmission and distribution  1   9   110   100 
Nuclear energy  41   49   962   854 
Fossil energy  581   581   4   54 
Basic energy sciences  1,110   1,221   1,20   1,568 
Fusion energy sciences  281   12   28   49 
Total   ,62   ,859   4,90   4,944 
source: DOE 200, 2008b. 
Note: Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy budget excludes funding for weatherization, intergovernmental activities, and the federal energy management program.
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2008 [Historical Tables, Table 9.8]). Over the same 
period, energy R&D funding halved from a high of 
more than $8 billion (in real 2007 dollars) to about 
$4 billion currently, or from 25 percent to 7 per-
cent of nondefense federal R&D spending, where 
it has roughly been for the past decade (Figure 6). 
Low fossil fuel prices, deregulation of the natural 
gas and electric utilities industries, and other factors 
led to substantial reductions in private sector R&D 
expenditures, while efforts to balance the federal 
budget, some notable energy R&D failures, and a 
lack of political interest led to a tandem decline in 
federal energy R&D spending. While much of this 
decrease may have been warranted at the time, the 
new energy technology challenges posed by global 
climate change and concerns over energy security 
have significantly increased the prospective value 
of increased public funding for energy-related re-
search. In response, the trend appears to be chang-
ing, with the most recent budget requests and con-
gressional appropriations increasing energy R&D 
measurably.
But how high should the federal energy R&D bud-
get go? And how fast should it rise? Ideally one 
would like to optimally determine and allocate 
the federal R&D budget across the wide variety 
of funded areas—thorough detailed evaluation of 
the technical opportunities, cost of research ef-
forts, likelihood of success, related private sector 
R&D, and ultimate economic and social payoff of 
research. While this is not practical at present, we 
are not entirely in the dark, and a number of facts 
suggest that a significant expansion of well-directed 
energy R&D funding is warranted.
Foremost, there is the magnitude of the cost of 
proposed climate mitigation policies. Recall that 
in §2.3 we found the cost to the United States of 
GHG mitigation through 2050 could be on the 
order of $1 to $10 trillion (<1 to 3 percent) of dis-
counted GDP, or an annualized $50–$500 billion 
per year. In §2.4 we also found that advanced tech-
nology holds the potential to lower these costs by 
tens to hundreds of billions of dollars annually in 
fIgUre 6
U.S. federal energy r&D Spending (1975–2007) with recommended Projections
source: IEA 200a, DOE 2008b, and author’s calculations. 
Note: The projections assume a  percent inflation rate so that $8 billion in nominal terms in 2016 is equivalent to $6.1 billion in real terms.
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 the United States and hundreds of billions to tril-
lions of dollars on a cumulative basis. Global cost 
savings from technological advance could be several 
times this level, and potentially increase the pros-
pects for broader and deeper participation of other 
countries in GHG mitigation. For example, recent 
IEA (2008) and UNFCCC (2007) assessments of 
financial requirements to respond to climate miti-
gation needs, estimate the necessity of at least dou-
bling clean energy R&D globally to stabilize or sig-
nificantly reduce GHG emissions within the next 
several decades.
Studies that have also considered the energy securi-
ty (e.g., oil and broader energy market disruptions) 
and conventional air pollution benefits of energy 
R&D find that these concerns further significantly 
increase the value of energy R&D (Schock et al. 
1999). Importantly, many innovations that address 
climate concerns also address concerns associated 
with energy security and local pollution, as well as 
yielding broader economic benefits. It will there-
fore be valuable to target funding at areas having 
the prospect to address multiple energy challenges 
at the same time. Innovations that increase energy 
efficiency clearly hold this potential, as do supply-
side innovations for renewable energy, advanced 
nuclear power, and CCS that increase fuel diversity 
at the same time they reduce multiple pollutants.
5.2. Proposal to Double federal Climate 
mitigation r&D Spending over the 
next eight years
A plan to roughly double federal climate mitiga-
tion R&D spending over 2007 levels, to $8 billion 
by 2016, is sensible, with periodic external, inde-
pendent evaluation during this period and further 
expansion of effort beyond this point if justified.31 
Figure 6 shows the last three decades of federal 
energy R&D spending in real terms, along with 
recommended funding increases over the next 
four to eight years. (Note the projections assume 
a 3 percent rate of inflation, so that $8 billion in 
nominal terms is equivalent to $6.1 billion in real 
terms.) These gradual increases would represent 
cumulative additional spending of about $22 billion 
through 2016 over 2007 levels of about $4 billion. 
This magnitude of recommended climate mitiga-
tion R&D spending is easily consistent with reason-
able assumptions about expected GHG mitigation 
costs, the prospects for R&D to lower those costs, 
and thus the rate of return to such R&D.32 
Ramping up research efforts at a significantly more 
rapid pace runs the risk of outstripping the capac-
ity of R&D managers and researchers to effec-
tively allocate and absorb the additional resources, 
thereby leading to waste.33 Increased demand for 
specialized R&D effort without a complementary 
increase in the supply of relevant R&D profession-
als also runs the risk of displacing or crowding out 
other valuable research activities, or of increasing 
salaries rather than effort. In addition, once R&D 
levels approach a desired longer-term level, the 
rate of growth should be gradually slowed rather 
than abruptly stopped in order to avoid a situation 
where the level of research support is insufficient 
to accommodate newly graduated researchers en-
tering the workforce. One way to avoid this risk is 
to increase innovative efforts gradually, and at the 
same time to emphasize graduate student and early 
31. Other suggestions that what we really need is a Manhattan Project or Apollo Project approach to climate mitigation R&D are misguided, 
however, for several reasons. For both of those efforts the government was the sole customer for a single, well-defined project, versus the 
millions of diverse users of a multitude of technologies that characterize energy technology markets. Cost was also not a key concern with 
those earlier projects, whereas with climate technology innovation cost competitiveness is the central issue. Those efforts also gave rise to a 
relatively short-lived burst of spending to solve a discrete problem, whereas what is likely to be required for climate technology innovation 
is steady incremental improvement over many decades. See Yang and Oppenheimer (2007) for a related discussion.
32. For example, assuming GHG-mitigation costs of $100 billion annually, and assuming these costs could be lowered by 10 percent through 
publicly funded energy R&D, $8 billion annually of R&D spending is consistent with a 25 percent rate of return to R&D ($100B x 10% 
= $8B x 1.25).
33. For example, Freeman and Van Reenan (2008) found that the rapid increase in spending by the National Institutes of Health during 
1998–2003 (which almost doubled in real terms over five years), and then the ensuing deceleration, created substantial adjustment prob-
lems in the market for research.
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career researcher support within public R&D fund-
ing (Freeman and Van Reenan 2008).
This increased funding should prioritize strategic 
basic research inspired by critical needs arising from 
efforts to develop new and improved GHG-mitiga-
tion technologies, and at the same time invests in 
training the next generation of scientists and en-
gineers. This would tend to imply prioritizing ad-
ditional funding to universities, which receive only 
about 15 percent of current DOE energy R&D 
funding, while government laboratories receive 
about two-thirds. In order to encourage explora-
tion of novel, emergent, or integrative concepts 
for addressing climate change, funding should also 
be increased for exploratory research that pursues 
transformational technologies that may not fit well 
within existing basic or applied research programs.34 
In unusual cases where there is a compelling need 
for public funding and collaboration for first-of-
a-kind technology demonstration, such projects 
should be carried out in close partnership with in-
dustry and should be focused on knowledge genera-
tion, as opposed to meeting production targets or 
deployment goals.
Some would argue with this focus. On one end of 
the spectrum, some take the perspective that the 
government should only fund the most basic type of 
scientific research, with limited regard to ultimate 
application. They would argue that to do otherwise 
is to meddle in the private sector. Others contend 
that the focus should be on near-term commercial-
ization and deployment, in order to help get clean 
energy technologies into the marketplace as soon 
as possible. From this perspective, R&D does not 
generate near-term GHG reductions.
Neither of these perspectives seems justified. While 
funding basic science relevant to energy production 
and use is clearly an essential role for the federal 
government—a role that should be continued—a 
more strategic focus is also necessary to ensure 
knowledge is created that is directly relevant to 
lowering the costs and expanding opportunities 
for GHG mitigation. At the other extreme, a focus 
on near-term deployment and large-scale demon-
stration spends scarce resources on efforts that are 
more effectively and efficiently undertaken by the 
private sector, induced by a GHG emissions price. 
In addition, under a cap-and-trade system, technol-
ogy deployment programs do not generate any ad-
ditional emissions reduction, which are determined 
by the cap. Instead, these policies simply reorient 
the technologies used to limit emissions to the cap, 
and in doing so tend to increase overall costs.
The concept of strategic basic research emphasized 
here is close in spirit to Stokes’s (1997) notion of 
use-inspired basic research, which unlike pure ba-
sic research, is inspired by the desire to develop 
improved technology, but unlike pure applied re-
search, also seeks to develop improved fundamen-
tal understanding. This orientation is particularly 
evident in a series of workshops and reports on 
basic research needs, sponsored by the DOE Ba-
sic Energy Sciences Program, and culminating in a 
recent announcement of awards for several Energy 
Frontier Research Centers.35 
In 2001, the Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Com-
mittee (BESAC 2003) started a process to assess 
the scope of fundamental scientific research neces-
sary to address DOE missions in energy efficiency, 
renewable energy sources, improved use of fossil 
fuels, nuclear energy, future energy sources, and re-
34. An exploratory research program could support high-risk, long-term, out-of-the-box concepts, in contrast to a more traditional focus 
emphasizing advances applicable to more familiar technologies (DOE 2006). The success of an exploratory research program, as well as 
the encouragement of greater risk taking within basic research programs, will depend in part on a greater willingness to tolerate individual 
project failures. In addition, the process for soliciting ideas and awarding grants for such research would need to explicitly encourage 
imaginative and fresh thinking, and award criteria may need to deemphasize a traditional focus on prior research and strong evidence of 
likely success.
35. Also see recent strategic planning efforts under the U.S. Climate Change Technology Program (Brown et al. 2006; DOE 2006).
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 duced environmental impacts of energy production 
and use (BESAC 2003; DOE 2008a).36 That study 
inspired a series of ten follow-on reports on basic 
research needs, based on workshops with university, 
national lab, government, and industry scientists 
over the past six years on
• the hydrogen economy,
• solar energy utilization,
• superconductivity,
• solid-state lighting,
• advanced nuclear energy systems,
• clean, efficient combustion of transportation fu-
els,
• electrical-energy storage,
• geosciences and the long-term storage of nuclear 
waste and CO2,
• materials under extreme environments,
• catalysis for energy-related processes,
• as well as a report on grand challenges in direct-
ing matter and energy (BESAC 2007).
To implement the collective recommendations from 
this process, the DOE Office of Basic Energy Sci-
ences is pursuing two complementary approaches: 
multi-investigator research via several new Energy 
Frontier Research Centers and a significant increase 
in single-investigator and small-group projects that 
currently form the bulk of its core research port-
folio. The current plan is for the Energy Frontier 
Research Centers awards to be in the $2 million–$5 
million range annually for an initial five-year period 
and for approximately $100 million to be available 
for multiple center awards starting in FY2009. Ex-
amples given by DOE of possible research topics 
include the following (DOE 2008a):
• Direct conversion of solar energy to electricity 
and chemical fuels
• Understanding of how biological feedstocks are 
converted into portable fuels
• New generation of radiation-tolerant materials 
and chemical separation processes for fission ap-
plications
• Addressing fundamental knowledge gaps in en-
ergy storage
• Transforming energy utilization and transmis-
sion
• Science-based geological carbon sequestration
For example, without effective electrical energy 
storage, intermittent renewable energy sources 
(e.g., wind and solar) cannot significantly displace 
fossil and other conventional sources of electricity 
(DOE 2008a). Likewise, current battery technolo-
gies are limited, impeding performance and mak-
ing plug-in hybrid or all-electric cars prohibitively 
costly. Fundamental research in electrical energy 
storage can accelerate scientific discoveries to help 
bridge these gaps in cost and performance relative 
to existing technologies. This is just one example 
of how targeted, strategic basic research motivated 
by GHG reduction and other energy goals has the 
potential to make a significant contribution to an 
overall climate policy strategy. Many other stud-
ies have identified a wide range of specific research 
needs for advancing energy technologies critical 
to GHG mitigation (see, e.g., Brown et al. 2006; 
DOE 2006; Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy [MIT] 2003, 2007; National Research Council 
[NRC] 2004).
Coming from many different perspectives—includ-
ing concerns over climate change, energy security, 
and economic competitiveness—a number of other 
studies have also recommended significant increases 
in federal energy R&D spending, both with respect 
to basic research (particularly in physical sciences 
and engineering; see National Academy of Sciences 
2007), as well as on the more applied end of the re-
search spectrum (National Commission on Energy 
Policy 2004; Ogden, Podesta, and Deutch 2007; 
36. BESAC was established in 1986 to provide independent advice to the DOE Basic Energy Sciences program on research and facilities 
priorities; proper program balance among disciplines; and opportunities for interlaboratory collaboration, program integration, and in-
dustrial participation. BESAC includes primarily representatives from universities, national laboratories, and industries involved in energy-
related scientific research. See http://www.sc.doe.gov/bes/BESAC/BESAC.htm.
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President’s Council on Science and Technology 
1997). Such recommendations have already made 
their way into specific legislation, including the En-
ergy Policy Act of 2005 and the America Competes 
Act (passed August 2007).
Among other things, the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 authorizes increases in the DOE budgets over 
2007–09 for the applied research programs (energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, distribution, fossil en-
ergy, and nuclear energy), as well as basic energy 
sciences, that are easily on track to double those re-
search budgets by 2016. The American Competes 
Act also authorizes increases in the budgets of the 
DOE Office of Science and other research agencies 
(the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
and NSF) through 2010 that would, if maintained, 
double these research budgets over about seven 
years (Stine 2008a). The primary legislative hurdle 
remaining appears to be with respect to appropria-
tions, avoidance of excessive earmarking of those 
appropriations, and maintaining commitment. At 
an authorization level, the notion of significantly in-
creasing these research budgets already commands 
substantial support.
Thus, a major concern for federal energy R&D 
is funding. Decisions about the funding source or 
sources to be used for these programs have conse-
quences for the magnitude and continuity of finan-
cial support in the future, as well as implications for 
the institutional management of funds and the de-
gree and nature of government oversight. Increased 
funding could come from general revenue sources; 
from revenues generated by emissions taxes or the 
sale of emissions allowances; or from wires and pipes 
charges on electricity and other fuels. In a federal 
fiscal context requiring budget neutrality, it may 
also be necessary to couple proposals for increased 
R&D spending with revenue-raising proposals. In 
that context, it may make pragmatic sense to cou-
ple emissions pricing or other provisions that raise 
revenue, with proposals for increased federal R&D 
funding and permanent R&D tax credits—regard-
less of whether there is explicit earmarking in the 
legislation. See Newell (2007a) for further discus-
sion of these options.
Recent cap-and-trade proposals in the U.S. Con-
gress have in fact targeted a significant portion of 
the value of emissions allowances (through either 
auctions or direct allowance allocations) to support 
low-GHG technologies. For example, estimates 
released along with the Boxer substitute to the Li-
eberman-Warner Climate Security Act (S. 3036) 
identify allowance-based allocations valued at more 
than $700 billion through 2050 (out of total allow-
ance allocations valued at an estimated $6.7 tril-
lion) for a variety of energy technology programs, 
including for energy efficient transportation and 
buildings, renewable energy, low-carbon electricity 
generation, carbon capture and sequestration, and 
international technology transfer.
However, as currently written virtually all of the 
more than $700 billion in allocations is targeted at 
commercial technology deployment as opposed to re-
search efforts of the type emphasized in this paper. 
For instance, the only provision in S. 3036 targeted 
toward R&D is an allowance allocation valued at 
$17 billion through 2050 (or about $500 million 
annually on average) for the Energy Transforma-
tion Acceleration Fund. This fund has been estab-
lished in the Treasury for the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), a new agency 
authorized within the Department of Energy by the 
America Competes Act of 2007, although ARPA-E 
has not yet been funded through appropriations.37  
As discussed elsewhere in this paper, such a focus is 
too limiting given the existing institutional struc-
tures in DOE that manage energy research (e.g., 
DOE Office of Science and other DOE program 
offices).
37. Now that it has been established (at least on paper), the question remains what an ARPA-E—with its own director, advisory board, and 
budget—could accomplish in practice that is distinct from the broader DOE mission and institution. For further discussion of the history, 
goals, and evaluation of the ARPA-E concept, see Newell (2007a) and Stine (2008b).
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 A further issue with the current structure of these 
provisions is that they allocate a fixed percentage of 
allowance revenues to specific purposes, the dollar 
value of which will depend on the number of auc-
tioned allowances, the level of the allowance price, 
and in turn on uncertain economic conditions. A 
more appropriate approach would be to allocate a 
dollar amount, as in usual appropriations, or at a 
minimum to subject any percentage based alloca-
tions to dollar caps. There is no reason to think that 
the appropriate level of expenditure on these pro-
grams is directly proportional to the value of emis-
sions allowances.
5.3. effective management and 
Coordination Would ensure that 
existing and Additional resources Are 
employed efficiently
At present, the federal government sponsors R&D 
on GHG-reducing technologies primarily through 
grants and contracts awarded to national labs, uni-
versities, and industry for energy-related research. 
This research support is administered largely by 
the DOE Office of Science and the DOE program 
offices: Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 
Fossil Energy, and Nuclear Energy. (See DOE or-
ganizational chart in Figure 7.) The NSF and other 
federal agencies also fund research relevant to en-
ergy and climate-mitigation technology, but these 
efforts tend to be on a smaller scale and, particularly 
in the case of NSF, are focused more on general 
science.38 Federal grants and contracts fund both 
research centers and individual projects, and are of-
ten but not always awarded through a competitive 
process involving a request for proposals, proposal 
review, and selection.
The current interagency oversight structure for 
this research is the Climate Change Technology 
Program, a counterpart to the Climate Change Sci-
ence Program, which focuses on the natural science 
of global warming and climate change processes 
(Figure 8).39 Analogous duel structures also existed 
during the Clinton administration, and effective in-
teragency structures for coordinating both climate 
change science and climate change technology 
initiatives among the Office of the President and 
relevant departments will be essential in the next 
administration.
Within DOE, the Office of Science focuses on basic 
research, while the program offices focus almost en-
tirely on applied R&D. The DOE Office of Science 
is the largest single supporter of U.S. basic research 
in the physical sciences, accounting for 40 percent 
of federal outlays in this area. Of the thirty-seven 
currently active FFRDCs, DOE sponsors sixteen—
more than any other agency.40 Otherwise known as 
the national labs, these sixteen FFRDCs perform 
about two-thirds of DOE-funded energy R&D 
and receive about 95 percent of their funding from 
the federal government. FFRDCs administered by 
universities and other nonprofit entities receive the 
majority of funding, with the remainder going to 
industry-run FFRDCs, industry, universities, and 
other nonprofit research organizations. Table 8 
shows how this funding was distributed to different 
entities engaged in energy R&D in FY2006.
DOE energy research has gone through several tran-
sitions over the past three decades, both in terms of 
its relative focus on precommercial basic research 
versus technology demonstration, and in terms of 
the emphasis placed on different technology areas 
38. OMB (2007) identified about $370 million in climate change technology-related outlays in 2007 at agencies other than DOE (i.e., NASA, 
EPA, DOD, USDA, NSF, DOT, DOC [NIST]), or less than 10 percent of overall federal climate technology R&D spending.
39. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 explicitly authorized the Climate Change Technology Program, administered within DOE’s Office of 
Climate Change Policy and Technology.
40. See http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf06316/ for a master list of all FFRDCs. The main DOE labs focused on energy science and technol-
ogy are the university-administered Ames, Argonne, Lawrence Berkeley, and Fermi labs; the industry-administered Idaho lab; the non-
profit-administered National Renewable Energy, Oak Ridge, and Pacific Northwest National labs; and the DOE-administered National 
Energy Technology Laboratory. All are overseen by the DOE Office of Science, except for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
the National Energy Technology Laboratory, and the Idaho National Laboratory, which are overseen by DOE’s Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy, Fossil Energy, and Nuclear Energy program offices, respectively.
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fIgUre 7
U.S. Department of energy organizational “Stovepipes”
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Deputy Administrator 
for Defense Programs
Assistant Secretary 
& Renewable Energy
Deputy Administrator 
for Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation
Assistant Secretary  
for Environmental 
Management
Deputy Administrator 
for Naval Reactors
Assistant Secretary  
for Fossil Energy
Deputy Administrator 
for Counter-terrorism
Assistant Secretary  
for Nuclear Energy
Deputy Administrator 
for Defense Nuclear 
Security
Assistant Secretary  
for Electricity Delivery 
& Energy Reliability
Deputy Administrator 
for Infrastructure & 
Environment
Legacy Management
Deputy Administrator 
for Emergency 
Operations
Civilian Radioactive 
Waste Management
Deputy Administrator 
for Management & 
Adminstration
10 Mar 08
Federal Energy 
Regulatory 
Commission
Secretary For 
Nuclear Security/
Administrator 
for National 
Nuclear Security 
Administration
Thomas P. D’Agostino
 
Under Secretary
C.H. Albright, Jr.  
Under Secretary
 
Under Secretary  
for Science
Dr. Raymond L Orbach 
Under Secretary  
for Science
Chief of Staff
Dr. Samuel Bodman, Secretary
Jeffery F. Kupfer, Deputy Secretary*
(Acting)
Computing Research 
Assistant Secretary 
for Policy & 
International Affairs
Assistant Secretary 
for Congressional & 
Intergovernmental Affairs
Chief Financial Economic Impact  
& Diversity 
Human Capital 
Management 
Hearings & Appeals 
General Counsel 
Health, Safety  
& Security
Chief Information Inspector General
Management
Intelligence & 
Counterintelligence
Public Affairs
Energy Information 
Administration
Bonneville Power 
Administration
Southeastern Power 
Administration 
Southwestern Power 
Administration
Western Area Power 
Administration 
Basic Energy Sciences
Biological & 
Environmental 
Research 
Fusion Energy Science
Nuclear Physics
Workforce 
Development for 
Teachers & Scientists
High Energy Physics
Departmental Staff 
Ofce of Sciencefor Energy Efciency
Advanced Scientic
Ofcer
Ofcer
source: www.energy.gov/organization/orgchart.htm.
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 fIgUre 8
Current Cabinet-level Committee on Climate Change Science and technology Integration
source: DOE 2006, p. 4.
Office of the President
Climate Change Policy and Program Review
by NSC, DPC, NEC
Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration
Chair: Secretary of Commerce*  Vice-Chair: Secretary of Energy*
Executive Director: OSTP Director
Secretary of State
Secretary of Agriculture
EPA Administrator
OMB Director
NEC Director
NASA Administrator
Secretary of the Interior
Secretary of HHS
Secretary of Transportation
Secretary of Defense
CEQ Chairman
NSF Director
Interagency Working Group on 
Climate Change Science and Technology
Chair: Deputy/Under Secretary of Energy*  
Vice-Chair: Deputy/Under Secretary of Commerce*
Executive Secretary: OSTP Associate Director for Science
Members DS/US Level:
CEQ, DOD, DOI, DOS, DOT, EPA, 
HHS, NASA, NEC, NSF, OMB, USDA
Climate Change Science Program
Director: Assistant Secretary of Commerce
For Oceans and Atmosphere Members:**
DOC, DOD, DOE, DOI, DOS, DOT, EPA, HHS, 
NASA, NSF, Smithsonian, USAID, USDA
Climate Change Technology Program
Director: Senior Ofcial
U.S. Department of Energy Members:
DOC, DOD, DOE, DOI, DOS, DOT, EPA, HHS, 
NASA, NSF, USAID, USDA
*Chair and Vice Chair of Committee and Working Group alternate annually. **CEQ, OSTP, and OMB also Participate
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(e.g., nuclear power, fossil fuels, energy efficiency, and 
renewables). (See NRC 2001 for a brief history.) Along 
the way, the department’s research objectives have also 
shifted from addressing concerns related primarily to 
energy security and resource depletion to a greater 
emphasis on environmental issues.
While the energy independence goal of the Nixon 
administration’s Project Independence quickly proved 
impractical, government policy with respect to energy 
R&D stressed the development of alternative liquid 
fuels well into the 1980s. This emphasis culminated 
in the creation of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation in 
1980, which became emblematic of the large, expen-
sive demonstration projects undertaken during that 
era (Cohen and Noll 1991). The following year, the in-
coming Reagan administration dramatically changed 
the direction of national energy policy; federal re-
search goals began to stress long-term, precompeti-
tive R&D and lower overall budgets. The 1980s were 
mostly a time of retrenchment for DOE’s research 
program, although funding levels stabilized in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Congressional appropria-
tions also began to emphasize environmental goals at 
that time, with large expenditures for the Clean Coal 
Technology demonstration program.
The shift to a greater emphasis on environmen-
tal goals, energy efficiency, and renewable energy, 
public-private partnerships, competitive award 
processes, and cost sharing with industry contin-
ued over the course of the Clinton administration 
tAble 8 
U.S. Department of energy r&D budget by Performer (fy2006) (percent)
Energy Efficiency  
and Renewable  
Energy 100   9 5  10 
   Basic research  1 1  1   
   Applied research 41 16 4 4 12  4 1
   Development 50 20 2 5 18  5 1
   R&D plant 5       5      
Fossil Energy 100 2 1 4 5 52 10 5
   Basic research 2      2 
   Applied research 4 6 1 1 1 24 8 1
   Development 55 1    4 28   4
Nuclear Energy 100  24 16 6  1 
   Applied research 99  24 16 5  1 
   Development 1       1      
Office of science 100 2 2 49 25 4 1 1
   Basic research 84 2 2 9 20 4 1 1
   R&D plant 16   10 5   
Total 100 9 4  25 9 15 2
source: NsF 200a. 
Note: Based on $4.5 billion in R&D spending by the DOE program offices and Office of science (which also supports non-energy related research).
office total Intramural ffrDCs Industry Universities nonprofit
                                                                        Industry    University    Nonprofit
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 in the 1990s. A number of studies over the past sev-
eral years have evaluated the performance of fed-
eral energy R&D programs.41 Although these R&D 
programs have produced some notable failures and 
although their performance has varied widely, these 
evaluations support the finding that federal energy 
R&D investments have yielded, on the whole, sub-
stantial direct economic benefits as well as external 
benefits such as pollution mitigation and knowledge 
creation. Government-sponsored energy R&D pro-
grams are also commonly thought to have improved 
substantially since the 1970s and early 1980s, both 
in terms of the way they are managed and in terms 
of the objectives they target. More generally, studies 
of specific technologies and government programs 
point to the critical role public sector research has 
played in laying the foundation for technological 
advances that have later had an enormous impact 
on the economy (David, Mowery, and Steinmuller 
1992), and quantitative estimates suggest the rate of 
return to publicly funded research is on the order of 
20–40 percent. (Note that these figures are not en-
ergy specific; see Cockburn and Henderson 2001; 
as well as Adams 1990; Griliches 1995; Mansfield 
1991; and Salter and Martin 2001.)
Recommendations for strengthening the organiza-
tion, management, and priorities of federal energy 
R&D efforts emerge from every recent major study 
of these activities (Chow and Newell 2004; Nation-
al Commission on Energy Policy 2004).42 Head-
way has been made at DOE along several of these 
lines, and a number of provisions in the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 codify recent trends in research 
management, including nonfederal cost sharing 
for projects, increased merit review and competi-
tive award of proposals, external technical review 
of departmental programs, and improved coordina-
tion and management of programs.43 Increased re-
sources should come with diligence toward further 
improvement.
Particularly in the context of increased funding for 
strategic basic research, perhaps the most important 
recommendation is to improve processes for com-
munication, coordination, and collaboration within 
DOE among the basic research programs in the 
Office of Science and the applied energy research 
“stovepipes” within the DOE program offices (fos-
sil fuel, nuclear, renewables, end-use efficiency). 
The type of process described above for identify-
ing basic research needs is one means to increase 
such communication, and to better align strategic 
basic research priorities with applied R&D needs. 
Such coordination should also extend to ongoing 
implementation of research priorities in an inte-
grated fashion, including through administrative 
mechanisms for closer collaboration, development, 
and evaluation of research-funding initiatives.
Continued use of an interoffice and interagency 
coordinating body, akin to the current Climate 
Change Technology Program, will be essential to 
improve coordination within DOE and between 
DOE and other agencies with roles related to cli-
mate mitigation technology innovation, domesti-
cally and internationally (see lower right of Figure 
8). While the focus here has been on the DOE R&D 
programs (because they make up at least 90 percent 
of the relevant federal R&D), other agencies (e.g., 
NASA, EPA, DOD, USDA, NSF, DOT, and DOC) 
have relevant research programs and will be better 
suited to tackling certain climate mitigation R&D 
needs. A regularized process for strategic planning, 
implementation, and evaluation of climate mitiga-
tion R&D, including more systematic analysis and 
oversight of the portfolio as a whole, is an essential 
means to a more balanced, integrated, and effective 
R&D program.44
41. For example, see Chow and Newell (2004) and NRC (2001) for reviews of several studies. See Jaffe and Lerner (2001) for an evaluation of 
national laboratory experience with technology commercialization, including an overview of assessments of the DOE labs.
42. In addition to the issues identified below, recommendations also often mention the need for increased cultivation of partnerships linking 
firms, national laboratories, and universities, as well as finding ways to reduce the impacts of congressional earmarking, micromanagement, 
and frequent shifts in budget levels and directions.
43. See DOE (1999) for an assessment of DOE’s use of merit reviews.
44. This includes more regularized use of planning, investment, and evaluation tools such as those developed in the context of recent NRC 
studies and associated DOE efforts to measure the prospective and retrospective benefits of applied energy R&D (NRC 2001, 2005, 
2007b).
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The Energy Policy Act of 2005 also designated an 
Under Secretary for Science who, in addition to 
overseeing the Office of Science and its basic sci-
ence research programs, also is to serve as the Sci-
ence and Technology Advisor to the Secretary of 
Energy and has general responsibility to monitor 
and advise the Secretary of Energy on R&D pro-
grams across the department, including supervision 
and support of research activities in the program 
offices. The extent and nature of coordinated R&D 
oversight across the numerous DOE offices that are 
most relevant to climate mitigation R&D requires 
ongoing clarification, however, given that these of-
fices currently report to different assistant secretar-
ies and undersecretaries.
In practice, good management, coordination, and 
ultimately the success of these programs is going 
to depend heavily on how high a priority is placed 
on them by future administrations, the individuals 
appointed to important management roles, and the 
specific strategies employed. As firms respond by 
increasing their own innovative efforts in response 
to increased financial incentives for GHG reduc-
tion, it will be increasingly important for public 
funding agencies to monitor these private research 
activities and coordinate their research priorities 
to maximize synergies and avoid duplication. Ac-
tive scientific and technical advisory committees, 
including industry participants, are one means of 
achieving this end.
5.4. Innovation Inducement Prizes for 
Climate mitigation Would broaden the 
Set of Available tools and Innovators
Alongside our system of patents and intellectual 
property rights, three primary mechanisms exist 
for encouraging R&D: (1) research contracts and 
grants; (2) research tax credits for the private sec-
tor; and (3) innovation inducement prizes.45 Con-
tracts and grants issued by the DOE and NSF for 
research performed at the national labs or by uni-
versities, other nonprofit institutions, and private 
firms represent by far the most important policy 
mechanism currently used to deliver federal sup-
port for energy R&D. Recently, attention has 
turned to innovation-inducement prizes or awards 
as another possible mechanism for delivering R&D 
incentives. The idea is to offer financial or other 
rewards for achieving specific innovation objectives 
that have been specified in advance (in contrast to 
ex-post awards like the Nobel Prize; Newell and 
Wilson 2005; Kalil 2007; NRC 2007a).
Inducement prizes have historically played a role in 
advancing technology in areas ranging from mari-
time navigation and canning to mathematics, com-
mercial aviation, and automotive engineering. More 
recently, in 2004 the $10 million Ansari X-Prize for 
private space flight became the largest such prize to 
be awarded. Recent prize proposals relevant to en-
ergy and climate policy include “Prizes for Achieve-
ment in Grand Challenges of Science and Technol-
ogy” authorized in the Energy Policy Act of 2005,46 
the H-Prize (for hydrogen) and Bright Tomorrow 
lighting prizes authorized in the Energy Indepen-
dence and Security Act of 2007,47 the privately 
45. In addition, important roles exist—within the public and private sectors—for coordination, planning, and road mapping of R&D activities; 
international cooperation; and general funding for national-level capacity building, including support for education infrastructure.
46. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (PL 109-58, §1008) authorizes the secretary of the DOE to “carry out a program to award cash prizes in 
recognition of breakthrough achievements in research, development, demonstration, and commercial application that have the potential 
for application to the performance of the mission of the Department.” It authorizes $10 million for this purpose.
47. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (PL 110-140, §654) calls for the secretary to “carry out a program to competitively 
award cash prizes . . . to advance the research, development, demonstration, and commercial application of hydrogen energy technolo-
gies.” Section 655 calls for the establishment within a year for three different prizes for the development of solid-state lighting packages 
to replace currently used lights: a 60-Watt Incandescent Replacement Lamp Prize of $10 million, a PAR Type 38 Halogen Replacement 
Lamp Prize of $5 million, and a Twenty-first Century Lamp Prize of $5 million.
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 funded Progressive Automotive X-Prize,48 and the 
Earth Challenge Prize announced by British finan-
cier Richard Branson.49 Only the last two of these 
have actually been funded and are under way.
A National Academy Committee recently endorsed 
the idea of establishing a program of innovation 
inducement prizes at the NSF—an idea for which 
Congress has expressed interest—and the America 
Competes Act gave NSF explicit authority to receive 
private donations for this purpose.50 The Reward 
Innovation in America Act (S. 1371), introduced in 
2007, would establish a National Innovation Prizes 
Board to develop and administer prizes in a range 
of areas. The prize approach has also been explicitly 
endorsed in some proposals as an instrument to be 
used by ARPA-E, were ARPA-E to be funded. Prize-
like approaches have also gained traction within the 
private sector in the form of firms like Innocentive 
that match seekers (organizations with challenging 
problems) with solvers (innovators with solutions) 
by offering the latter cash awards. Successful solv-
ers often come from fields that are distant from 
seekers’ fields; the more diverse the problem-solv-
ing population, the more likely a problem is to be 
solved.51 Among other things, Innocentive has a 
philanthropic subprogram devoted to clean tech 
and renewable energy, offering prizes supported by 
a private foundation.
Inducement prizes are clearly not suited to all re-
search and innovation objectives, but they have the 
potential to play a larger role along with other in-
novation policy instruments such as research con-
tracts, grants, and R&D tax credits. In contrast to 
these other instruments, prizes have the attractive 
incentive property of targeting and rewarding in-
novation outputs, rather than inputs: the prize is 
paid only if the objective is attained. This can help 
encourage maximal research effort per dollar of 
public research funding. Prizes or awards can also 
help to focus efforts on specific high-priority ob-
jectives, without specifying how the goal is to be 
accomplished. Because prize competitors select 
themselves based on their own knowledge of their 
likelihood of success—rather than being selected in 
advance by a research manager—prizes can also at-
tract a more diverse and potentially effective range 
of innovators from the private sector (e.g., industry 
or individual entrepreneurs), universities, and other 
research institutions.52 Hybrid approaches coupling 
a limited number of competitive R&D contracts for 
efforts to win a prize should also be considered to 
more effectively attract competitors from tradition-
al research institutions, where individuals operate 
principally under a financial model requiring ad-
vance commitments for R&D effort.53
Rather than wait for Congress to predetermine 
what specific innovations will be targeted by induce-
ment prizes, the DOE and other appropriate agen-
cies should embrace the approach and undertake 
a systematic assessment of what specific technical 
and scientific challenges in GHG mitigation could 
fruitfully be addressed through a prize approach, 
as well as the best institutional arrangements for 
doing so. The most challenging tasks in designing 
a prize are selecting appropriate prize topics and 
crafting rules governing the type of contest, size of 
award, and criteria and methods for determining the 
48. The specific targets of the $10 million Progressive Automotive X-Prize competition are fuel economy of at least 100 MPG equivalent; 
total well-to-wheels GHG emissions of less than 200 grams per mile (CO2 equivalent); criteria pollutants no worse than US EPA Tier II, 
Bin 5 requirements; GHG emissions from production no worse than typical production of vehicles today; production capability; and other 
factors such as safety, cost, and features. See http://www.progressiveautoxprize.org/.
49. The Virgin Earth Challenge was launched September 2, 2007, promising a prize of $25 million to whoever can demonstrate to the judges’ 
satisfaction a “commercially viable design which results in the removal of anthropogenic, atmospheric greenhouse gases so as to contribute 
materially to the stability of the Earth’s climate” (http://www.virginearth.com/).
50. This effort would be launched as an experimental program in close consultation with the academic and nonprofit community, technical 
societies, and industry.
51. See Lakhani and Jeppesen (2007) for a discussion of Innocentive’s approach.
52. Conversely, the traditional grants process often relies on the expertise of potential grantees to propose not only a technical approach, but 
also the specific technical objectives. Thus, the demands on the granting agency in designing a prize can be higher than the traditional 
grants process, although the ability to target specific objectives is also higher.
53. Some procurement and R&D processes follow a related approach, where funding may be given for the development of proposals to com-
pete for an ultimate contract.
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winner (NRC 2007a). Doing so requires extensive 
consultation with experts and potential participants 
to ensure the prize goals relate to important societal 
needs and opportunities, embody a significant yet 
achievable advance, are clear and understandable to 
prospective participants, and are stated in an ob-
jective, unambiguous way to avoid any doubt as to 
whether a particular advance would qualify as the 
winner (NRC 2007a).
DOE (and possibly other relevant agencies) should 
launch an experimental series of prizes over the 
next several years employing a small fraction of the 
additional funds recommended elsewhere in this 
strategy, or about $200 million in an initial phase, 
with additional funds thereafter in accordance with 
an evaluation of the first phase. Prizes could be de-
signed to advance achievements both on the more 
basic as well as the applied end of the research spec-
trum. The recent NAS report on inducement prizes 
provides very useful guidance for development of 
such a program, which should involve all the DOE 
research offices. It may make sense for DOE to 
contract out part of the administration of a prize 
program, use different management strategies for 
different prizes, or make prize management a focus 
of ARPA-E (if ARPA-E comes into being). Assets 
outside of DOE for specific inducement prizes in-
clude deep knowledge of particular technical do-
mains and research communities, as well as exper-
tise in advertising, marketing, and branding.
DOE should also consider designing prizes in the 
form of, or supplemented by, procurement con-
tracts for equipment that the government other-
wise needs to purchase, but that would be required 
to meet advanced technical and cost criteria. This 
is one means of incorporating economic cost 
considerations into the design of prizes, which is 
otherwise quite difficult. Prize design involving 
procurement would need to be developed in close 
coordination with the General Services Adminis-
tration and Office of Federal Procurement Policy. 
Finally, inducement prizes could offer a productive 
means of promoting joint international funding of 
climate mitigation R&D, and inducing innovations 
relevant to a developing country context, without 
preordaining the country in which or specific means 
by which the prize objectives would be met (Newell 
2008). These prize design and management consid-
erations are important and require further detailed 
development, but should not stand in the way of 
program establishment.
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The purpose of this innovation strategy is to outline how a well-targeted set of climate policies, including those targeted directly at 
science and innovation, could help lower the overall 
costs of mitigation. It is important to stress, how-
ever, that poorly designed technology policy will 
raise rather than lower the societal costs of climate 
mitigation. To avoid this, policy should create sub-
stantial incentives in the form of a market-based 
price on GHG emissions, and directed govern-
ment technology support should emphasize areas 
least likely to be undertaken by a private sector. As 
discussed, this would tend to emphasize strategic 
basic research that advances science in areas criti-
cal to climate mitigation. In addition to generating 
new knowledge and useful tools, such funding also 
serves the critical function of training the next gen-
eration of scientists and engineers for future work 
in the private sector, at universities, and in other 
research institutions.
6. Avoiding mistakes and Concluding remarks
Climate technology policy must complement rath-
er than try to substitute for emissions pricing. On 
the research side, R&D without market demand for 
the results is like pushing on a rope, and would ulti-
mately have little impact. On the deployment side, 
technology-specific mandates and subsidies will 
tend to generate emissions reductions in a relatively 
expensive, inefficient way relative to an emissions 
price, and under an economywide cap-and-trade 
system will not actually generate any additional 
reductions. The scale of the climate technology 
problem and our other energy challenges requires 
a solution that maximizes the impact of the scarce 
resources available for addressing these and other 
critical societal goals. An emissions price plus R&D 
approach provides the basic framework for such a 
solution.
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